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ABSTRACT 
 
In the first essay titled “Divestitures and Acquisition Probability”, I examine the 
relationship between a firm‟s divestiture activities and the likelihood that the firm will 
become an acquisition target. Using a logit model comparing a sample of target firms 
matched with a sample of non-target firms from 1986 to 2010, we find that a firm is 27 
percent more likely to be acquired within three years of a divestiture activity than if there 
was no previous divestiture, and the effect is stronger for firms with fewer numbers of 
segments. Our finding is robust to modifications of control variables, to managerial 
entrenchment, as well as to alternative diagnoses. Consistent with the literature, we find 
the market reacts positively to a divestiture announcement. However, cross-sectionally 
we find the market reaction is positively related to whether or not the divesting firm 
adopts a golden parachute feature and negatively on the firm‟s number of segments 
which is related to the probability of future acquisition. 
In the second essay titled “The Choice of Divestiture and Long-run Performance: 
Asset Sell-off versus Equity Carve-out,” I examine the post-divestiture long-run 
performance of two different choices of corporate divestiture, asset sell-offs versus equity 
carve-outs, and find that the choice of divestiture method has important implications for 
post-divestiture long-run performance. My findings show that the sell-off parents‟ long-
run abnormal returns are significantly higher than those of the carve-out parents. I also 
find evidence that the long-term abnormal performance improves with a reduction in the 
v 
 
diversification discount. The effect of the diversification discount is weaker for divesting 
parents with higher levels of R&D. My results further show that a firm‟s pre-divestiture 
number of segments and level of asymmetric information are positively related to the 
probability of an asset sell-off. 
 
 
 
1 
 
 
DIVESTITURES AND ACQUISITION PROBABILITY 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Oct 14, 2004: US-based Company BellSouth announced the completion of its 
sale of its international assets, three Latin American wireless units, including its 
Panamanian and Guatemalan operations, to Spanish carrier TelefónicaMóviles SA. 
March 5, 2006: AT&T announce to acquire fellow phone company BellSouth in 
a stock deal worth $67 billion, creating a telecommunications giant that dwarfs its 
nearest competitor, Verizon Communications. 
 
While prior mergers and acquisitions research has debated whether takeovers 
create value overall, there is no debate that target shareholders generally reap large gains 
from these transactions.  For example, in reviewing 25 studies examining the shareholder 
returns in mergers, Bruner‟s (2002) summary of the wealth effects of takeovers shows 
that the average two-day cumulative abnormal return for target shareholders around the 
merger announcement is around 20 to 30%. 
1
 Given the highly attractive shareholder 
wealth gains associated with becoming a takeover target, managers focusing on the best 
interests of their shareholders may have an incentive to take steps to increase the 
likelihood of becoming a takeover target.  While the above example from the financial 
press highlights real world examples of this hypothesis, the existing mergers and 
acquisitions literature has not empirically examined the strategic actions firms can take to 
make themselves more attractive as possible takeover targets. Does shedding off units 
increase the likelihood of being acquired? Prior literature shows that there is a negative 
                                                          
1
 See also Jensen and Ruback (1983), Bradley, Desai, and Kim (1988), Franks, Harris, and Titman (1991), 
Andrade, Mitchell and Stafford (2001) among many others. 
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relation between diversity and firm value (see Berger and Ofek (1995), Lamont and Polk 
(2002), among others), and other studies argue that diversifying acquisitions destroy 
value. If this is the case, then refocusing the firm by reducing the number of segments 
may enhance the attractiveness of the firm as a potential takeover target.  
We hypothesize that target firms will become more attractive after divesting one 
or more segments for several reasons. First, the target‟s size may be relatively large to the 
bidders‟, which makes the firm too big to be an easy target. For example, Dietrich and 
Sorensen (1984), Palepu (1986), among others, find that size is negatively related to the 
probability that a given firm will be a merger target. One possible explanation is that 
several costs associated with a takeover deal increase as the size of the target company 
increases. As a result, a smaller size decreases acquisition costs. In addition, the 
complexity of the deal also increases when the size of the target gets bigger. Therefore, in 
becoming smaller by divesting a unit, the target may have a higher number of potential 
bidders. Second, the target might be operating in a number of different segments, some of 
which may be of no interest to potential bidders who do not operate in these lines of 
business. If they choose to buy the whole target, the post-merger performance of the 
combined firm may be worse off because of the acquirer's inexperience in some of the 
target‟s business segments. Consequently, the bidder may prefer to buy only segments 
that are related to their business. Third, Berger and Ofek (1995) document that the value 
of a firm that has more segments will suffer more from a diversification discount. 
Therefore, a firm with a higher number of segments will be a less attractive target to 
bidders, compared to a firm with a lower number of segments. Fourth, as mentioned 
previously, several studies suggest that diversifying acquisitions destroy value. Thus, 
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through divestiture, a firm may make a merger more feasible and attractive for bidders 
and can potentially increase the likelihood of becoming a target in an acquisition.  In this 
paper, we conduct several direct tests to examine whether firms that shed off one of their 
divisions increase the probability of becoming an attractive takeover target. We further 
test whether the hypothesis still holds when a firm divests a segment for different 
reasons. 
Related to our study, Cusatis, Miles and Woolridge (1992) investigate the value 
created through spinoffs and find that both the spun-off subsidiary and their former 
parents subsequently experience a relatively high incidence of takeovers, compared to a 
set of control firms match on size and industry. Specifically, they found that out of 131 
parents that distributed spinoffs, 18 become takeover targets, compared to seven of their 
matched firms. Also, among 146 spinoffs, 21 spinoffs are taken over, compared to five of 
their matched firms. However, if managers want to strategically shed off one business 
segment and thereby effectively create pure plays for prospective bidders, divestiture via 
a subsidiary sale would be a more effective method as opposed to spinoff. Most spinoffs 
in the United States are structured as tax-free transactions as in Cusatis et al. (1992). 
Under Section 355 of the Internal Revenue Code, a spinoff maybe structured as a tax-free 
transaction only if it satisfies certain requirements, one of which is that neither the parent 
nor the subsidiary can be acquired within two years after the spinoff. Violations of this 
requirement would trigger an often substantial tax liability at the parent company level 
which will significantly lower the premium that target shareholders receive from the 
acquisition. As a result, a manager who wants to strategically increase the odds of his 
firm being a target would choose a divestiture where the unit is acquired immediately in 
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the divestiture, and the parent can be acquired any time after that. While a parent that 
conducts a spinoff can be acquired within the two year post-spinoff period, this type of 
acquisition would trigger a substantial tax liability which would reduce the gain from 
acquisition and make the acquisition less attractive to potential bidders. Therefore, a 
manager who wants to strategically increase his firm‟s likelihood of being a target would 
be more apt to choose a quicker and more effective method of divestiture, an asset sell-
off, rather than a spinoff.  
In addition to the above, our paper is also different from Cusatis et al. (1992) in 
that we provide a more complete multivariate test of our hypothesis using an acquisition 
likelihood model as in Palepu (1986), Song and Walkling (2005), and Cai and Vijh 
(2007). Cusatis et al. (1992) provides a simple observation of takeover incidence in a 
small sample with basic univariate analysis. We provide multiple robustness checks to 
make sure the hypothesis holds in different situations. To the best of our knowledge, this 
is the first study that provides a comprehensive multivariate analysis based on a takeover 
prediction model to test the hypothesis that firms increase the likelihood of being a 
takeover target by engaging in a prior divestiture. The divestiture literature has 
highlighted that the market reacts positively to the news that a firm is divesting one or 
more segments. The M&A literature clearly shows significant positive shareholder 
wealth gains for target firms. However, there may be an important, yet unexplored link 
between these two strategic corporate actions. In this paper, we attempt to fill this gap in 
the literature by studying the effect of a firm‟s divestiture activity on its likelihood of 
becoming an acquisition target.   
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Our sample consists of 2,256 takeover targets during the period from 1986 
through 2010.  Using a matched control sample of 2,256 non-target multi-segment firms 
(matched by year, industry, size, and book-to-market), we examine the relationship 
between a firm‟s divestiture activities and the likelihood that the firm will become an 
acquisition target. Our results indicate that such a firm is 27 percent more likely to be 
acquired within three years of a divestiture activity than one that did not engage in this 
activity. The finding contributes to the literature by providing new evidence on how a 
firm‟s strategic restructuring via divestiture activity can increase its likelihood of 
becoming a takeover target. 
We find that our results hold even after we control for the motives of the 
divestiture. A firm may divest a segment for different reasons. For example, a parent firm 
may divest one of its segments simply because of financial constraints. It may need cash 
to invest in a profitable project, or to expand the current business, or to pay back debt. On 
the other hand, it is possible that the firm is not subject to financial constraints, but it 
divests a segment strategically to make itself an attractive target for a bid. Controlling for 
different possible divestiture motives, our results still hold. That is, the odds of a firm 
being acquired after engaging in a prior divestiture activity is significantly higher than 
one that did not engage in that activity, regardless of whether or not the firm divests 
because it is financially constrained or it wants to invest.  
When firms divest, firms that are both financially constrained and have high 
growth/investment opportunities (most likely divest to invest or expand production, less 
likely to make itself an attractive acquisition target) consistently experience lower 
increase in acquisition likelihood compared to firms that neither are financially 
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constrained nor have high growth/investment opportunities (least likely divest to invest or 
expand production, more likely to make itself an attractive acquisition target). The results 
suggest that a firm will have a high chance of receiving a takeover bid when it 
strategically divests to make itself an attractive takeover target. 
One possible explanation for the increase in acquisition likelihood of divesting 
parents may be the cash payment that the divesting parent receives when it sells a 
segment. The parent firm can use the cash to retire debt and lower the firm‟s leverage 
ratio, which subsequently make the firm a more attractive target. We control for this issue 
by examining a sub-sample of divestitures with stock payment. The results (not reported) 
still hold using this sub-sample, indicating that a divesting parent will increase its 
probability of becoming a target by engaging in a prior divestiture, even in an all stock 
payment divestiture. This finding further supports our main hypothesis. 
When we propose the main hypothesis, we assume that managers work in the best 
interests of their shareholders. However, given the loss of control associated with an 
acquisition, managers whose benefits are not aligned with those of shareholders will not 
want their firms to be acquired. The threat of dismissal and the loss of income may 
encourage the target management to avoid seeking any takeover attempt, regardless of 
shareholder interests. In other words, entrenched managers may not want to give up 
control of their firms. Jensen (1988) argues that properly constructed severance pay 
agreements, termed “golden parachutes”, mitigate the principal-agent conflict between 
shareholders and managers and thus will facilitate a successful takeover. Target managers 
can agree to a takeover attempt worrying less about loss of jobs, benefits, and income 
since their golden parachutes at least compensate them for these losses. We, therefore, 
7 
 
control for whether or not a firm has the golden parachute feature when it divests. We 
also include several management entrenchment proxies in our regressions.  
First, research shows that managers‟ benefits are more aligned with shareholders‟ 
benefits when they own more equity in their companies. Those managers may have an 
incentive to take steps to increase the likelihood of becoming a takeover target, given the 
highly attractive shareholder wealth gains associated with becoming a takeover target. 
For example, Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1988), and Cotter and Zenner (1994) find that 
managers with smaller equity stakes are more likely to resist takeover bids. We use 
CEO‟s ownership proportion to proxy for the manager‟s incentive to work in the best 
interests of his shareholders. Moreover, CEOs around the age of retirement are less likely 
to value control, which means they are less likely to impede an acquisition. We therefore 
control for CEO age. The results suggest that prior divestiture increases the likelihood of 
becoming a takeover target, even after controlling for alternative CEO incentives related 
to managerial entrenchment. 
We hypothesize that a firm will become an attractive takeover target by engaging 
in a prior divestiture activity, because there are benefits (diversification discount) that are 
associated with the reduction in the number of business lines in which the firm is 
operating. If this is the case, the marginal effect of divestiture on acquisition likelihood 
should be smaller for firms that have a higher number of segments as compared to firms 
that have fewer segments. Our results indicate that when firms divest, those with a higher 
number of segments experience a smaller increase in the probability of becoming a 
takeover target as compared to firms with a lower number of segments. More 
interestingly, the marginal effect of divestiture on acquisition probability is strongest for 
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firms that had exactly two segments prior to the divestiture activity, thus becoming a 
single-segment firm after the divestiture. 
Song and Walkling (2000) develop and test the “acquisition probability 
hypothesis” in which they assert that rivals of initial acquisition targets face an increase 
in probability that they will be targets themselves. Therefore, we control for the effect 
that an acquisition wave in a firm‟s industry may have on its probability of becoming a 
target. We find that the probability of a firm being acquired is significantly higher if the 
firm engaged in a prior divestiture activity, even after controlling for the 
acquisition ”hotness” of the firm‟s industry.  
Consistent with other research, we find that the market reacts positively to the 
news that a firm will divest. We find that there is no difference between CARs of 
divesting parents that later be acquired within 3 years and parents that are not. Our 
abnormal return analysis results show that conditional on the divestiture activity, the 
market reacts positively if the divesting firm adopts the golden parachute feature and 
reacts negatively if the divesting firm has a higher number of segments. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as following: Section II discusses related 
literature and develops testing hypotheses; Section III describes sample and data sources; 
Section IV presets empirical test framework and results; Section V illustrates the results 
from robustness tests; and Section VI concludes. 
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2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The extent literature in mergers and acquisitions show that target shareholders 
reap the lion's share of gains in merger transactions.  For successful and completed 
acquisitions, acquirers pay an average premium of 30% over and above the current 
market value of the target's shares. For all acquisitions, the target's average abnormal 
return on the merger announcement day is around 20 to 30% (see Jensen and Ruback 
(1983), Bradley, Desai, and Kim (1988), Franks, Harris, and Titman (1991), Andrade, 
Mitchell and Stafford (2001) among many others).  Given that takeovers tend to be 
highly attractive for target shareholders, previous studies have been interested in 
identifying factors that can be used to predict acquisition targets. For example, an early 
study by Simkowitz and Monroe (1971) analyzes takeover targets in 1968. In comparing 
samples of acquired and non-acquired firms based on financial ratios, the authors find 
that acquired firms tend to be smaller in size, have lower PE and dividend payout ratios, 
and lower equity growth rates. Similarly, Stevens (1973) also concludes that financial 
ratios are useful in classifying target firms. He finds that targets are likely to be more 
liquid and have a lower level of leverage.  Wansley et al. (1983) further finds that targets 
generally have less debt, but faster growth and smaller market to book ratios.  Consistent 
with these finding, Billett (1996) finds that as debt outstanding increases, the likelihood 
of being acquired decreases. Dietrich and Sorensen (1984) also show that targets are 
more likely to have low turnover and smaller dividend payout.  Hasbrouck (1986) finds 
that non-financial target firms are characterized by low q ratios and a smaller current 
liquidity ratio. However, their results indicate that leverage is not a significant factor. In 
addition to these above findings, Palepu (1986) also documents that inefficiency, growth-
10 
 
resource imbalance, and low growth are likely to increase a firm‟s probability of 
becoming a target. Using multiple discriminant analysis (MDA), Barnes (1990) finds that 
targets in the U.K from 1986 to 1987 have higher liquidity levels but lower profit 
margins.  In analyzing the factors associated with takeover probability, Song and 
Walkling (2000) provide evidence that the probability of a firm becoming a target is 
higher if a rival firm in the same industry was previously acquired. North (2001) finds 
that managerial ownership is negatively related to takeover likelihood. Cai and Vijh 
(2007) document that higher illiquidity discounts of target CEO holdings is associated 
with higher probability of being a target because acquisitions allow target CEOs to 
remove liquidity restrictions on stock and option holdings and diminish the illiquidity 
discount. Contrary to many older findings in the literature that smaller size is associated 
with higher probability of becoming a target, Offenberg (2009) find that larger firms are 
more likely to be the targets of disciplinary takeover than smaller firms.  
The threat of dismissal and the loss of income may encourage the target 
management to avoid seeking any takeover attempt regardless of shareholder interests. 
Jensen (1988) hypothesize that “golden parachute” help mitigate the principal-agent 
conflict, and therefore, will make a takeover more likely to be successful. Machlin, Choe, 
and Miles (1993) test Jensen‟s conjecture and find that the adoption of a golden parachute 
is associated with a greater likelihood of a successful acquisition. In addition, Bebchuk, 
Cohen, and Wang (2010) report that golden parachutes are associated with increased 
likelihood of either receiving an acquisition offer or being acquired. Our study 
contributes to this stream of literature by examining whether previous restructuring 
activity can enhance the attractiveness of the firm as a takeover target.   
11 
 
3. DATA SOURCES AND SAMPLE SELECTION  
Our sample requirements include collecting merger data as well as prior 
divestiture data. We obtain the initial sample of acquisitions from the Securities Data 
Company‟s (SDC) U.S Mergers and Acquisitions Database. We screen the data using the 
following criteria: (1) The deal value is equal to or greater than $5 million; (2) The 
announcement date is from 1986 to 2010; (3) The deal is unconditional and complete; (4) 
The acquirer controls 0% of the shares of the target before the announcement date and 
controls 100% of the target shares after the effective date; and (5) both the acquirer and 
the target are public firms. These criteria result in a sample of 11,199 target firms. We 
further require that: (7) the target firms have at least 3 years of financial data on 
Compustat in the years prior to the announcement date and (8) the firms have stock price 
available in the CRSP database and (9) the firms must be multi-segment ones. The above 
screening process leaves us with a sample of 3,477 acquisition target firms. Then we 
construct a control sample of non-target firms. Our matching criteria are firm size, book 
to market, and industry affiliation, which all are measured as of the end of the fiscal year 
prior to the announcement date. In addition, non-target firms in our control sample are 
required to meet the requirements (7), (8) and (9) as well. The above procedure leaves us 
with a sample of 2,389 acquisition targets and 2,256 non-targets which meet the selection 
and data requirements. As shown in Table 1.1, the number of targets varies each year 
with a minimum of 15 targets in 2004 and a maximum of 201 targets in 1999. The 
highest frequencies of mergers occurred in the late 1990's during the soaring stock market 
period. 
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Using completed deals involving public acquirers in the SDC database, we obtain 
the initial sample of divestiture cases in which the parent company engaged in a 
divestiture activity from 1986 to 2010. Applying similar refinement criteria for the same 
period, we have the sample of 7356 firms that engaged in divestiture activity during the 
period of 1986-2010. We then merge the two databases, where the parent firm in the 
divestiture sample subsequently became the acquisition target in the acquisition sample. 
We also apply two other requirements: (1) the effective date of the divestiture is before 
the announcement date of the corresponding acquisition; (2) the announcement date of 
the corresponding acquisition should not exceed 3 years after the effective date of the 
divestiture. As shown in table 1.1, this selection procedure yields a sample of 576 
(25.5%) target firms that engaged in at least one divestiture activity within 3 years before 
being acquired. 
We obtain business segment information from COMPUSTAT‟s segment database 
and construct a variable named “Number of Segments” which is the number of business 
lines, of each target firm in the sample, including those that previously divested and those 
that did not. Those non-divestiture firms in the sample have to be multi-segment firms, as 
they could have engaged in a divestiture activity. 
Summary statistics for the sample of acquisition targets and the control sample of 
non-targets are shown in Table 1.2.  A comparison of the two groups shows that about 
25.5 percent of the targets previously engaged in divestiture while the corresponding 
number of the non-target group is only 10.9 percent. Both groups have an average 2.5 
number of segments and have similar financial characteristics. However, the targets are, 
on average, lower growth firms, which is consistent with Morck, Shleifer and Vishy 
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(1990)‟s finding that acquiring growth firms is value destructive to the acquirer. Also, the 
targets have lower book to market ratio. 
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4. METHODOLOGY 
Following Dietrich and Sorensen (1984), Palepu (1986), Song and Walkling 
(2005), and Cai and Vijh (2007), we use a logit model to examine the relationship 
between divestiture activity and the probability of becoming a subsequent target.  P(i,t) is 
the probability that a firm i will be acquired in period t, and x(i,t) is a vector measuring a 
firm‟s characteristics, and   is a vector of unknown parameters to be estimated.  
P (i, t) = 1/[1+e  ] 
Variables and hypothesis 
The vector x contains seven factors, which are frequently used in the prior 
literature. The main factor of interest in this study is the divestiture dummy.  
X1 = Divestiture dummy: equals one if a firm engaged in a divestiture activity 
before the acquisition announcement date. 
X2 = Firm size. We expect the takeover probability to be lower for larger firms as 
several costs associated with the takeover deal increase as the size of the target company 
increases. 
X3 = Book to Market (BTM). Low BTM firms are less likely to be targets 
because they are relatively “pricey”. However, low BTM firms are firms with high 
potential growth, so they may be attractive targets for takeover. 
X4 = Profitability, measured as Return on Assets (ROA). The market for 
corporate control (Jensen (1986)) supports the argument that takeover is a useful 
mechanism to replace managers who fail to maximize shareholder‟s wealth, so poorly-
performing targets may have greater likelihood of acquisition. At the same time, a well-
performing target may be perceived as having more value to the bidder. 
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X5= Leverage. High debt ratio suggests lower potential debt capacity. Firms with 
high leverage are less likely to be targets. 
X6 = Liquidity. Firms with high liquidity are expected to be more attractive as 
takeover targets.  
X7 = Growth, measured as the sales growth rate of a firm. Acquiring growth firms 
is value destructive to the acquirer according to Morck, Shleifer and Vishy (1990). At the 
same time, a rapidly growing firm may be attractive to bidders. 
The dependent variable in the logistic regressions will take the value of one if a 
firm is an acquisition target and zero if that firm is not a target. The matching sample is 
selected as follows: we downloaded all the firms on COMPUSTAT, and then exclude 
those firms that were targets in the M&A database. For each year, we sort each firm into 
different industries by taking the first two digit numbers of the firm‟s SIC code, and 
within each industry, further sort firms into deciles based on size (measured by firm‟s 
market value). Each target firm in the sample is matched with one non-target multi-
segment firm within the same industry, whose market capitalization and book-to-market 
ratio in the year prior to the merger were closest in the same deciles. 
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5. RESULTS 
The regression results of the logit model are shown in table 1.3. The variable of 
interest is a divestiture dummy that takes the value of one if a firm engaged in a prior 
divestiture and takes the value of zero otherwise. The regression includes other 
independent variables corresponding to the hypotheses discussed in part 4.  
The odds estimates of the logit model and their associated z-value are presented in 
model (1) of table 1.3. We also include the likelihood ratio index as well as the likelihood 
ratio statistic. The coefficient for the divestiture dummy variable is statistically 
significant and has the expected positive sign. The economic significance is not trivial. 
The marginal effect coefficient of the divestiture dummy variable, calculated at the mean 
value of vector X, is 0.27, and it is significant at the 1% level of confidence. In other 
words, the odds of a firm being acquired is 27 percent higher for firms that previously 
divested than for firms that did not engage in this activity, after controlling for other firm 
characteristics. This finding provides support for our main hypothesis which predicts that 
firms that engaged in a prior divestiture would increase the probability of becoming an 
attractive takeover target in a subsequent acquisition. The coefficient on book-to-market 
variable is also positive significant which means “pricey” firms are less likely to be 
targets. The results also show that growth is negatively associated with takeover 
probability, which means firms with high growth rate are less likely to be acquisition 
targets. Other coefficients are not statistically significant. 
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6. DIAGNOSTICS 
In this section, we check the robustness of our hypothesis that divestitures 
increase the probability of becoming a target in an acquisition.  First we control for a 
firm‟s management entrenchment as it can strongly affect the firm‟s likelihood of being a 
target. We then check whether the finding above is changing with the reasons why a firm 
may divest. Next, we add firms‟ number of segments to the regression, addressing the 
concern that the marginal effect of divestiture on acquisition probability would be smaller 
for firms with a higher number of segments. Then we control for merger and acquisition 
waves, as Song and Walkling (2002) find that when a firm is acquired, it increases the 
probability that other firms in the same industry are acquired.  
A. Management Entrenchment 
One possible concern with the results presented in table 1.3 is a firm‟s 
management entrenchment can affect the likelihood that the firm will become an 
acquisition target. Jensen and Ruback (1983) talk about the takeover market where 
different management groups compete for the rights to direct the allocation of the firm‟s 
assets. This means simply that if one manager thinks he can use the assets of a firm better 
than another, he simply acquires the firm and removes the manager. This type of takeover 
is also seen in a proxy fight, where a large shareholder attempts to takeover the firm. 
Managers battle for the rights of the corporation where the winner controls the hiring, 
firing, and compensation decisions. This market for corporate control helps to regulate 
the labor of top management, like other competitive jobs would be fought for. In our 
main hypothesis, we assume that the agency problem is not severe and managers may 
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work in the best interests of their shareholders. However, given the loss of control 
associated with a takeover, managers whose benefits are not aligned with those of 
shareholders may not want his firm to be acquired. The threat of losing control and 
income may prevent the target management from seeking any takeover attempt regardless 
of shareholder interests.  
Jensen (1988) conjectures that a golden parachute may reduce the principal-agent 
conflict between share-holders and managers and thus will facilitate a successful 
takeover. Target managers can agree to a takeover attempt without worrying about loss of 
jobs, benefits and income since their golden parachutes at least compensate them for 
these losses. Machlin, Choe, and Miles (1993), and Bebchuk, Cohen, and Wang (2010) 
both document that golden parachute adoption is associated with an increased likelihood 
of successful acquisition. Thus, we control for whether or not a firm has the golden 
parachute feature when it divests.  
In addition, research shows that managers‟ benefits are more aligned with 
shareholders‟ when their ownership proportion is higher. Those managers may have an 
incentive to take steps to increase the firm‟s likelihood of being a target, given the highly 
attractive shareholder wealth gains in an acquisition. For example, Morck, Shleifer, and 
Vishny (1988), and Cotter and Zenner (1994) document that managers with higher equity 
stakes are less likely to resist to takeover bids. We use CEO‟s ownership proportion to 
proxy for the manager‟s incentive to work in the best interests of his shareholders.  
Furthermore, CEOs who are at retirement age may be less likely to value control, 
and thus, may be less likely to resist to an acquisition. Weisbach (1988) finds that a 
nontrivial number of resignations take effect on the CEO‟s sixty-fifth birthday and these 
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resignations are likely to be actual retirements, unrelated to performance. In addition, 
Goyal and Park (2002) also mention that turnover of CEOs around age 65 are more likely 
due to normal retirements than to forced departures. Jenter and Lewellen (2011) study the 
impact of target CEOs‟ retirement preferences on the incidence of takeover bids and find 
evidence that the likelihood of an acquisition increases sharply when the target CEO 
reaches age 65. We, therefore, include an CEO age dummy variable that takes the value 
of one if a firm‟s CEO age is equal to or older than 64 (in our sample, the average time 
between a firm‟s divestiture announcement date and the time it receives a bid is 1 year) 
and takes the value of zero otherwise. Moreover, Weiback (1988) reports that the median 
tenure for CEOs who resign from outsider-dominated and insider-dominated firms are 9 
and 7.5 years, respectively.  Goyal and Park (2002) find that the median tenure is equal to 
7 in their sample. If a CEO has been in place for 7 years, it may be more likely that he 
will leave the current positive and, therefore, will be less likely to resist an acquisition. 
On the other hand, the length of time a manager holds the CEO position may imply he is 
an “entrenched” manager. We control for the CEO tenure effect by including a tenure 
dummy variable that takes the value of one if a firm‟s CEO tenure is equal to or greater 
than 6 and zero otherwise. 
Five additional logit models are presented in table 1.3. In model (2), golden 
parachute is positively related to the probability of becoming a target, significantly at the 
5% level of confidence. We use the CEO age and ownership dummy variables in models 
(3) and (5) to control for the CEO entrenchment level. We include all these variables in 
model (6). The divestiture dummy variable is still statistically significant and has the 
expected positive sign in all these models. Thus, the results provide evidence that prior 
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divestiture increases the likelihood of becoming a takeover target even after controlling 
for alternative CEO incentives related to managerial entrenchment. 
B. Reasons of divestiture 
While the preceding results support the view that divestiture activity is positively 
related to the probability of subsequently becoming a target, the findings could be biased 
if the motives behind a divestiture are not carefully examined. A firm may divest for 
different reasons. One reason for divestiture may be financial constraints. For example, a 
firm that engaged in a prior divestiture may be in need of cash to pay back debt, or to 
invest, expand production when it is financially constrained. That is, it has positive 
investment projects but at the same time, is constrained by large amount of debt relative 
to its optimal leverage and thus, may raise funds for its investment projects by engaging 
in a divestiture activity. Several studies indicate that asset sales are used as a method of 
generating cash when the firm is financially constrained. Schlingemann, Stulz, and 
Walking (2002) find that the divestiture announcements are often preceded by a period of 
poor operating performance. Furthermore, Ofek (1993) finds that firms with high 
leverage are more likely to sell assets. Officer (2007) finds that firms that engaged in 
divestiture activity have lower cash balances and cash flow. 
On the other hand, a firm may divest strategically to make itself an attractive 
acquisition target. If a firm divests because it is financially constrained and needs to pay 
back debt, would the effect on acquisition probability still hold? If a firm sells a 
subsidiary to invest, will this change the likelihood that the firm will become an 
acquisition target? To address these different motivations, we re-estimate the regression 
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in model (1) of table 1.3, controlling for firms‟ financial constraints and investment 
opportunities in the fiscal year before the divestiture activity. We use the cash balance 
and cash flow, both scaled by total asset, leverage ratio, operating performance 
(measured as net income plus depreciation scaled by book value of assets), and coverage 
ratio (defined as EBIT divided by interest expense ) as proxies for a firm‟s financial 
constraint. We use the growth rate in sales and growth in capital expenditure to proxy for 
the growth and investment opportunities the firm may have in the following year. We 
then re-estimate the effect of a firm‟s divestiture activity on its likelihood of being a 
target if the firm is financially constrained. We also re-estimate the effect of a firm‟s 
divestiture activity on its likelihood of being a target if the firm is growing fast and may 
have positive investment projects. The break point is the industry-median.  
Five different pairs of regressions are presented in Panel A of table 1.4. In each 
pair, we re-estimate the effect of a firm‟s divestiture activity on its likelihood of being a 
target using two sub-samples of target firms that are more likely to be financially 
constrained and target firms that are more likely to be exempt from that problem. The 
first column in each pairs is re-estimated regressions of model (1) in table 1.3 on target 
firms that are more likely to be financially constrained: low operating performance, low 
cash balance, low cash flow, high leverage and low interest expense coverage. The 
second column in each pairs is re-estimated regression of model (1) in table 1.3 on target 
firms that are not likely to be financially constrained: high operating performance, high 
cash balance, high cash flow, low leverage and high interest expense coverage.  
In all these regressions, the coefficients for the divestiture dummy variable are 
statistically significant and have the expected positive sign. However, the marginal effect 
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of divestiture in the even columns is consistently higher than those of the odd columns. 
The results provide evidence that supports the following two conclusions. First, the odds 
of a firm being acquired after engaging in a prior divestiture activity is significantly 
higher than one that did not engage in that activity, whether or not the firm is financially 
constrained. Second, the results support our hypothesis that a firm may divest 
strategically to make itself an attractive acquisition target. In all regressions, if the firm 
divests not because it is financially constrained, the increase in likelihood of being a 
target is consistently higher. This finding provides support for our hypothesis, which 
predicts that a firm that engaged in a prior divestiture will increase its likelihood of being 
a takeover target in an acquisition, regardless of the motive of the divestiture. 
Two different pairs of regressions are presented in Panel B of table 1.4. In each 
pair, we re-estimate the effect of a firm‟s divestiture activity on its likelihood of being a 
target using two sub-samples of target firms that are more likely to have growth and/or 
investment opportunities and target firms that are less likely to have. The first column in 
each pairs is re-estimated regressions of model (1) in table 1.3 on target firms that high 
growth and investment opportunities. The second column in each pairs is re-estimated 
regressions of model (1) in table 1.3 on target firms that are not likely to have growth or 
investment opportunities. In all these regressions, the coefficients for the divestiture 
dummy variable are statistically significant and have the expected positive sign. However, 
the marginal effect of divestiture in the even columns is consistently higher than those of 
the odd columns. The results provide evidence that supports the following two 
conclusions. First, the odds of a firm being acquired after engaging in a prior divestiture 
activity is significantly higher than one that did not engage in that activity, whether or not 
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the firm divests to invest.  Second, the results support our hypothesis that a firm may 
divest strategically to make itself an attractive acquisition target. In all regressions, if the 
firm divests when it does not have growth or investment opportunities, the increase in 
likelihood of being a target is consistently higher. This finding provides support for our 
hypothesis, which predicts that a firm that engaged in a prior divestiture will increase its 
likelihood of being a takeover target in an acquisition, regardless of the motive of the 
divestiture. 
We provide a robustness check in panel C of Table 1.4. We re-estimate the effect 
of a firm‟s divestiture activity on its likelihood of being a target on three different sub-
samples of target firms: firms that are both financially constrained and have high 
growth/investment opportunities (most likely divest to invest or expand production, less 
likely to make itself an attractive acquisition target); firms that either are financially 
constrained or have high growth/investment opportunities, but not both; and firms that 
neither are financially constrained nor have high growth/investment opportunities (least 
likely divest to invest or expand production, more likely to make itself an attractive 
acquisition target). The results are consistent with our hypothesis. In all these regressions, 
the coefficients for the divestiture dummy variable are statistically significant and have 
the expected positive sign. However, the marginal effect of divestiture is increasing from 
model (1) to model (3). That is, a firm will have a high chance of receiving a takeover bid 
when it strategically divests to make itself an attractive takeover target. 
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C. Number of segments   
We hypothesize that a firm will become an attractive takeover target by engaging 
in a prior divestiture activity, because there are benefits (diversification discount) that are 
associated with the reduction in the number of business lines in which the firm is 
operating. If this is the case, it is likely that the effect should be smaller for the firm that 
operates in many segments as compared to another firm that operates in a few segments. 
For example, if there are two firms with similar financial characteristics, both engaging in 
a prior divestiture, a firm with a higher number of segments (i.e.,5 segments) should 
experience a smaller increase in the probability of becoming a takeover target as 
compared to another firm with a lower number of segments (i.e., 2 segments). 
Furthermore, diversification discount theory predicts that diversified firms tend to be 
valued at a discount as compared to focused firms. Therefore, we predict that the 
likelihood of a firm being acquired should be negatively related to its number of business 
segments when it divests a segment.   
In model (1) of table 1.5, we provide a test for the effect of a firm‟s number of 
segments on its likelihood of being a target in an acquisition if the firm engaged in a prior 
divestiture. We re-estimate the regression in model (1) of table 1.3, adding the interaction 
variable between the divestiture dummy variable and the firm‟s number of segments. The 
regression also includes other independent variables corresponding to the hypotheses 
discussed in part 4. 
The results provide strong support for our hypothesis. The marginal effect of the 
divestiture dummy variable, calculated at the mean value of vector X, is 0.31 and it is 
significant at the 1% level of confidence. In other words, the probability of a firm being 
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acquired is 31% higher if the firm engaged in a prior divestiture activity. This is the 
marginal effect of divestiture on acquisition probability for firms that had exactly two 
segments prior to the divestiture activity, thus becoming a single-segment firm after the 
divestiture. The coefficient on the interaction variable is statistically significant and has 
the expected negative sign. It means that a firm‟s likelihood of being a target in an 
acquisition would be lower for each increment in the firm pre-divestiture number of 
business segments. For example, a firm with five segments when divest will increase its 
likelihood of being an acquisition target and that likelihood is equal to two-third the 
likelihood that a divesting firm with only two segments. This result strongly supports our 
hypothesis. In addition, including the interaction variable does not take away the power 
of the divestiture dummy variable.  
D. Acquisition trend 
Song and Walkling (2000) develop and test the “acquisition probability 
hypothesis” in which they assert that rivals of initial acquisition targets face increased 
probability that they will be targets themselves. Therefore, we control for the effect that 
an acquisition wave in a firm‟s industry may have on its probability of becoming a target. 
Specifically, for each firm in the regression sample, we include an industry “hotness” 
measure, which is the number of acquisitions in the target industry within the past year. If 
our main hypothesis is true, then including this variable should not alter the result found 
above. 
In model 2 of table 1.5, we re-estimate our main regression, adding a industry 
“hotness” variable which is measured as the number of acquisitions in the target industry 
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within the past year. The result shows that the number of acquisitions in a firm‟s industry 
during the last one year is not related to its probability of being an acquisition targets. 
The divestiture dummy variable is positive and statistically significant. In other words, 
the probability of a firm being acquired is significantly higher if the firm engaged in a 
prior divestiture activity, controlling for the acquisition ”hotness” of the firm‟s industry. 
Thus, the increased probability of takeover following a divestiture is not driven by 
acquisition waver within the industry. 
E. CAR analysis                                          
In table 1.6, for each of the firms that engaged in a prior divestiture activity in our 
final sample, we calculate the cumulative abnormal returns during several period 
windows around the divestiture announcement date. The cumulative abnormal returns 
were estimated using the market model for two groups of firms that engaged in 
divestiture activity: firms that subsequently become a target in an acquisition within three 
years from the divestiture date, and firms that do not. Consistent with the literature, we 
find that the market reacts positively when firms divest, regardless of whether they 
become a target later on or not. However, in panel A, the t-statistic test shows no 
difference in CARs for these two groups of firms around the announcement date for all 
the estimated windows. 
In panel B, we reports the coefficients from multivariate regressions of CAR (-2, 
+2) on a set of independent variables that seem to affect the acquisition likelihood. 
Conditional on the divestiture activity, if the firm has the golden parachute feature, the 
market reaction is higher (4%) than if there is no golden parachute provision in place. 
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Similarly, the positive reaction is weaker for firms that have a higher number of segments. 
We interpret the results as evidence that golden parachutes increase, and number of 
segments mitigate, the acquisition probability when a firm divests.  
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7. CONCLUSION 
Given the attractive wealth gains that takeovers provide for target firm 
shareholders, identifying factors that can affect the probability of takeover has been a 
topic of interest not only to academic researchers but to investors as well. Real world 
examples suggest that firms may take strategic actions to make themselves more 
attractive as potential takeover targets. We empirically address this issue by examining 
whether a firm that engaged in a divestiture activity will increase its likelihood of being 
acquired in a takeover. Based on logit models using a sample of 2,256 target firms and a 
matched sample of 2,256 non-target firms, we estimate the increase in probability that a 
firm becomes a target in an acquisition by engaging in a prior divestiture. Our evidence 
shows that a firm that engaged in divestiture activity is 27 percent more likely to be 
acquired within three years of the divestiture than one that did not engage in this activity. 
The results are statistically significant and robust to modifications of the model based on 
alternative divestiture motives and managerial incentives. 
We also find evidence that even though the market reacts positively when a firm 
divests, the level of reaction depends on whether the divesting firm adopts the golden 
parachute feature and on the firm‟s number of segments. 
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Table 1.1 Sample distributions by year 
This table reports the total number of target firms in year of the sample period, as well as subsamples of targets that 
did and did not engage in a prior divestiture. 
 
  Target Non-Target 
Divestiture 
Yes 576 246 
No 1680 2010 
 Total 2256 2256 
 
 
  
Total target firms Targets that did not divest Targets that divested Divestiture/ 
Target 
 
Event year Frequency Percent Frequency Percent Frequency Percent by year 
1986 142 6.3% 129 7.7% 13 2.3% 9.2% 
1987 133 5.9% 113 6.7% 20 3.5% 15.0% 
1988 129 5.7% 105 6.3% 24 4.2% 18.6% 
1989 91 4.0% 70 4.2% 21 3.6% 23.1% 
1990 34 1.5% 24 1.4% 10 1.7% 29.4% 
1991 28 1.2% 24 1.4% 4 0.7% 14.3% 
1992 20 0.9% 14 0.8% 6 1.0% 30.0% 
1993 33 1.5% 26 1.5% 7 1.2% 21.2% 
1994 75 3.3% 50 3.0% 25 4.3% 33.3% 
1995 114 5.1% 80 4.8% 34 5.9% 29.8% 
1996 105 4.7% 77 4.6% 28 4.9% 26.7% 
1997 151 6.7% 116 6.9% 35 6.1% 23.2% 
1998 153 6.8% 109 6.5% 44 7.6% 28.8% 
1999 201 8.9% 147 8.8% 54 9.4% 26.9% 
2000 164 7.3% 116 6.9% 48 8.3% 29.3% 
2001 106 4.7% 76 4.5% 30 5.2% 28.3% 
2002 52 2.3% 42 2.5% 10 1.7% 19.2% 
2003 58 2.6% 41 2.4% 17 3.0% 29.3% 
2004 15 0.7% 2 0.1% 13 2.3% 86.7% 
2005 85 3.8% 58 3.5% 27 4.7% 31.8% 
2006 99 4.4% 66 3.9% 33 5.7% 33.3% 
2007 95 4.2% 65 3.9% 30 5.2% 31.6% 
2010 70 3.1% 44 2.6% 26 4.5% 37.1% 
2009 40 1.8% 36 2.1% 4 0.7% 10.0% 
2010 63 2.8% 50 3.0% 13 2.3% 20.6% 
Total 2256 100.00% 1680 100.00% 576 100.00% 25.5% 
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Table 1.2 Summary statistics 
 
This table presents means and differences in means for the target firms and their benchmark firms. The sample 
contains 2256 target firms from 1986 to 2010. Divestiture is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if a target 
firm engaged in divestiture activity within a three year-time frame prior to the acquisition announcement and zero 
otherwise. Number of segments is the firm‟s number of different business lines. Size is measured as the logarithm of 
the firm‟s market value of equity at the end of the previous fiscal year. Book to market is the ratio of book value to 
market value of equity. Return on assets is net income divided by the book assets. Leverage is the book value of 
total debt divided by the sum of the book value of total debt and the market value of equity. Growth is measured by 
the change in sales. Statistical significance of the mean difference is based on the t-test and is denoted with ***, **, 
and * for 1%, 5%, and 10% rejection levels, respectively. 
 
 
Variables N Target (1) Benchmark (2) 
Difference 
(1) - (2) 
p-Value 
Divestiture 2256 0.255 0.109 0.146 <0.0001
***
 
Number of 
segments 
2208 2.43 2.48 -0.05 0.1
*
 
Size 2256 5.14 5.09 0.05 0.42 
Book to Market 2256 0.74 0.69 0.05 0.002
***
 
Return on Assets 2170 -0.02 -0.02 0.00 0.72 
Leverage 2254 0.178 0.183 0.005 0.78 
Growth 2234 0.307 0.387 0.08 0.05
**
 
CEO age 452 55.5 55.2 0.3 0.55 
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Table 1.3 Divestitures, management entrenchment and acquisition likelihood 
 
  Management Entrenchment 
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Divestiture 0.27 0.24 0.25 0.23 0.26 0.22 
 (11.91)
***
 (7.16)
 ***
 (7.25)
 ***
 (6.61)
 ***
 (2.64)
 **
 (6.55)
 ***
 
Size -0.002 -0.004 -0.007 -0.003 -0.04 -0.001 
 (0.3) (0.56) (0.36) (0.17) (0.17) (1.08) 
Book to market 0.042 0.023 0.05 0.005 0.05 0.076 
 (2.96)
 ***
 (0.52) (0.39) (0.16) (0.21) (0.25) 
ROA -0.02 -0.13 -0.015 -0.064 0.3 0.017 
 (0.66) (1.27) (0.30) (0.15) (0.28) (0.53) 
Leverage 0.00 0.002 -0.005 0.037 -0.09 -0.04 
 (0.81) (1.04) (0.32) 0.35 (0.24) (0.23) 
Liquidity 0.03 0.026 0.4 0.04 0.01 0.08 
 (0.96) (1.21) (0.06) 0.32 (1.08) (0.47) 
Growth -0.03 -0.09 -0.007 -0.16 -0.15 -0.21 
 (2.26)
 **
 (1.52) (1.54) (1.02) (0.42) (1.14) 
Golden Parachute  0.07    0.06 
  (2.3)
 **
    (1.96)
**
 
CEO Age >=64   0.03   0.04 
   (1.82)
 *
   (1.55) 
CEO tenure     0.06  0.12 
    (1.79)
 *
  (0.44) 
CEO ownership      0.013  
     (1.65)
 *
  
Control for year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Control for Industry Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No of observation 3796 784 752 692 312 634 
Likelihood ratio 
index 
0.03 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.09 0.06 
Likelihood ratio 
statistic 
145.23 138.76 113.25 115 37.24 56.22 
 
 
This table reports the odds obtained from estimating logistic regression models of acquisition likelihood. Also 
reported are the corresponding t-statistics in parentheses. In each model, the dependent variable takes the value of 
one if the firm is a target in a completed acquisition and zero otherwise. This is a logit regression on 2256 target 
firms that were acquired during the period 1986-2010 and 2256control non-target firms that are matched based on 
year, industry, market to book and size. For each target firm, in the year of the acquisition, we randomly select a 
control firm from COMPUSTAT that operates in the same industry (using the first two digits SIC code 
classification) and has the market capitalization and market to book in the same deciles. The independent variables 
are defined details in table 1.2. Divestiture is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if a target firm engaged in 
divestiture activity within a three year-time frame prior to the acquisition announcement and zero otherwise. 
Number of segments is the firm‟s number of different business lines. Size is measured as the logarithm of the firm‟s 
market value of equity at the end of the previous fiscal year. Book to market is the ratio of book value to market 
value of equity. Return on assets is net income divided by the book assets. Leverage is the book value of total debt 
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divided by the sum of the book value of total debt and the market value of equity. Liquidity is defined as the sum of 
cash balance and short-term investment over the total asset. Growth is measured by the change in sales. Golden 
parachute is an indicator variable equal to one if the firm employs this governance feature as reported by IRRC. 
CEO age dummy takes values of one if the CEO is older than 63 and zero otherwise. CEO tenure is a dummy 
variable that takes value of one if the number of years that the CEO has held the chief executive office is greater 
than or equal to 6 and takes value of zero otherwise. CEO ownership is the number of shares owned by the CEO as a 
fraction of shares outstanding. T-values are reported in the parentheses and is denoted with ***, **, and * for 1%, 
5%, and 10% rejection levels, respectively. 
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Table 1.4 Divestiture motivations and acquisition likelihood 
 
Panel A: Financial distress 
Sample 
Operating 
Performance 
Cash Balance Cash Flow Leverage Coverage ratio 
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
 Low High Low  High Low High High Low Low High 
Divestiture 0.19 0.33 0.25 0.31 0.22 0.32 0.24 0.29 0.24 0.29 
 (5.78)
 ***
 (10.18)
 ***
 (8.66)
 ***
 (8.81)
 ***
 (6.85)
 ***
 (10.41)
 ***
 (8.28)
 ***
 (7.41)
 ***
 (6.62)
 ***
 (8.66)
 ***
 
Size -0.01 -0.02 -0.002 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 0.01 -0.02 0.01 -0.01 
 (1.53) (2.39)
 **
 (0.8) (1.4) (2.36)
 **
 (2.87)
 ***
 (1.36) (2.04) (1.49) (1.03) 
Book to market 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.02 0.04 0.03 0.05 
 (2.03)
 **
 (1.36) (1.98) 
**
 (1.95) 
*
 (2.13) 
*
 (1.77) 
*
 (1.28) (1.07) (1.19) (1.58) 
ROA   0.15 -0.004 -0.04 -0.12 0.03 0.01 0.02 -0.06 
   (2.38)
 **
 (0.09) (0.96) (0.91) (0.69) (0.21) (0.3) (0.42) 
Leverage -0.11 -0.04 -0.004 -0.08 0.00 0.00   -0.00 -0.00 
 (0.54) (0.66) (1.47) (1.53) (1.1) (0.97)   (0.32) (0.00) 
Liquidity 0.11 -0.07     0.06 -0.04 -0.00 0.03 
 (1.20) (0.66)     (0.94) (0.65) (0.00) (0.43) 
Growth -0.005 0.02 -0.007 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 -0.02 -0.03 -0.01 
 (1.21) (0.48) (0.63) (1.34) (1.26) (1.01) (1.42) (1.17) (1.87)
 *
 (0.82) 
Control for year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Control for 
Industry 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
# of obs 2096 2092 2190 2102 1888 2368 2036 1786 1410 0930 
Likelihood ratio 
index 
0.04 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.03 
Likelihood ratio 
statistic 
110.2 111.49 88.89 91.92 69.39 113.02 82.39 58.23 64.24 80.03 
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Panel B: Investment and growth opportunities 
Sample Investment Opportunities Growth Opportunities 
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Low High Low  High 
Divestiture 0.29 0.22 0.27 0.24 
 (5.78)
 ***
 (6.29)
 ***
 (8.76)
 ***
 (7.18)
 ***
 
Size -0.001 -0.003 -0.02 -0.01 
 (1.53) (0.33) (2.39) (1.47) 
Book to market 0.02 0.06 0.01 0.05 
 (2.03)
 **
 (2.71)
 ***
 (0.7)  (2.35) 
**
 
ROA -0.09 0.07 0.11 -0.02 
 (1.29) (1.57) (1.27) (0.49) 
Leverage 0.09 -0.00 -0.09 0.06 
 (0.54) (1.51) (1.73)
 *
 (0.97) 
Liquidity 0.05 -0.02 0.05 0.09 
 (1.20) (0.36) (0.77) (1.35) 
Growth -0.01 -0.00   
 (1.21) (1.11)   
Control for year Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Control for Industry Yes Yes Yes Yes 
# of obs 1944 1740 2112 1710 
Likelihood ratio 
index 
0.04 0.03 0.03 0.03 
Likelihood ratio 
statistic 
91.36 49.28 85.11 67.53 
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Panel C: Divestiture motivation and acquisition Likelihood 
Sample 
Financial Distress 
and High Investment 
Opportunities 
Financial Distress or 
High Investment 
Opportunities 
Non- Financial 
Distress and Low 
Investment 
Opportunities 
Model (1) (2) (3) 
Divestiture 0.19 0.22 0.33 
 (3.89)
 ***
 (7.73)
 ***
 (8.14)
 ***
 
Size 0.01 0.001 -0.01 
 (0.76) (0.27) (1.4) 
Book to market 0.07 0.04 0.04 
 (2.4)
 **
 (2.23)
 **
 (0.96) 
ROA -0.01 0.01 -0.2 
 (0.19) (0.34) (0.90) 
Leverage -0.08 -0.08 -0.06 
 (0.97) (1.38) (0.67) 
Liquidity 0.06 0.02 0.03 
 (0.73) (0.38) (0.38) 
Growth -0.005 -0.004 -0.06 
 (1.02) (1.22) (1.37) 
Control for year Yes Yes Yes 
Control for Industry Yes Yes Yes 
# of obs 845 2568 1162 
Likelihood ratio index 0.03 0.03 0.05 
Likelihood ratio 
statistic 
24.02 79 72.92 
 
This table reports the odds obtained from estimating logistic regression models of acquisition likelihood. 
Also reported are the corresponding t-statistics in parentheses. The dependent variable takes the value of 
one if the firm is a target in a completed acquisition and zero otherwise. This is a logit regression on 2256 
target firms that were acquired during the period 1986-2010 and 2256 control non-target firms that are 
matched based on year, industry, market to book and size. For each target firm, in the year of the 
acquisition, we randomly select a control firm from COMPUSTAT that operates in the same industry 
(using the first two digits SIC code classification) and has the market capitalization and market to book in 
the same deciles. The independent variables are defined in details in table 1.2.  Divestiture is a dummy 
variable that takes the value of one if a target firm engaged in divestiture activity within a three year-time 
frame prior to the acquisition announcement and zero otherwise. Number of segments is the firm‟s number 
of different business lines. Size is measured as the logarithm of the firm‟s market value of equity at the end 
of the previous fiscal year. Book to market is the ratio of book value to market value of equity. Return on 
assets is net income divided by the book assets. Leverage is the book value of total debt divided by the sum 
of the book value of total debt and the market value of equity. Liquidity is defined as the sum of cash 
balance and short-term investment over the total asset. Growth is measured by the change in total asset. 
Cash is the cash balance, and cash flow is defined as operating income before depreciation. Coverage ratio 
is defined as EBIT divided by interest expense. Operating performance is measured as net income plus 
depreciation scaled by book value of assets. Growth opportunities and investment opportunities are defined 
as the growth in sales and the growth in capital expenditures in the year t-1. T-values are reported in the 
parentheses and is denoted with ***, **, and * for 1%, 5%, and 10% rejection levels, respectively. 
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Table 1.5 Other robustness checks 
 
 No of segments Acquisition Trend 
Model (1) (2) 
Divestiture 0.31 0.27 
 (7.52)
 ***
 (11.59)
 ***
 
Divestiture * # of segments -0.04  
 (1.67)
 *
  
# of acquisitions  0.006 
  (0.49) 
Size -0.02 -0.001 
 (0.43) (0.17) 
Book to market 0.04 0.04 
 (1.96)
 *
 (2.31)
 ***
 
ROA 0.09 0.006 
 (0.90) (0.17) 
Leverage -0.001 -0.07 
 (0.96) (1.57) 
Liquidity 0.018 0.04 
 (0.39) (0.80) 
Growth -0.013 -0.01 
 (1.84)
 *
 (1.27) 
Control for year Yes Yes 
Control for Industry Yes Yes 
No of observation 3820 3392 
Likelihood ratio index 0.03 0.03 
Likelihood ratio statistic 145.61 144.21 
 
This table reports the odds obtained from estimating logistic regression models of acquisition likelihood. 
Also reported are the corresponding t-statistics in parentheses. The dependent variable takes the value of 
one if the firm is a target in a completed acquisition and zero otherwise. This is a logit regression on 2256 
target firms that were acquired during the period 1986-2010 and 2256 control non-target firms that are 
matched based on year, industry, market to book and size. For each target firm, in the year of the 
acquisition, we randomly select a control firm from COMPUSTAT that operates in the same industry 
(using the first two digits SIC code classification) and has the market capitalization and market to book in 
the same deciles. The independent variables are defined in details in table 1.2.  Number of segments is the 
firm‟s number of different business lines. Number of acquisitions is calculated in the firm industry within 
the past year. T-values are reported in the parentheses and is denoted with ***, **, and * for 1%, 5%, and 
10% rejection levels, respectively. 
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Table 1.6 CAR Analysis 
  
Panel A 
Cumulative Abnormal Return at Divestiture announcement date 
 Divested, target firms Divested, non-target firms Difference 
Variables N MEAN t-value N MEAN t-value t-stat 
CAR (-2,0) 482 1.9% 3.49
***
 206 2% 2.44
**
 1.03 
CAR(-2,+2) 482 2.3% 3.23
***
 206 2.1% 2.9
**
 1.09 
        
 
 
 
Panel B 
 
Variables CAR(-2,+2) 
Growth 0.02 
 (0.46) 
Leverage 0.04 
 (1.47) 
Number of segments -0.01 
 (2.48)
 **
 
Golden Parachute 0.04 
 (3.71)
 ***
 
CEO Ownership 0.001 
 (1.61) 
CEO Age 0.005 
 (1.14) 
No of obs 785 
F-Statistic 3.28 
R-Square 0.14 
  
 
Panel A shows the average cumulative abnormal returns of the 2 groups of firms around the divestiture 
announcement date. The first group includes firms that divested and then became acquisition targets within 
3 years from the divestiture date. The second group includes firms that divested but were not acquired 
within 3 years from the divestiture date. Panel B reports the coefficients from multivariate regressions of 
CAR (-2, +2) on a set of independent variables that seem to affect the acquisition likelihood. T-values are 
reported and is denoted with ***, **, and * for 1%, 5%, and 10% rejection levels, respectively 
 
 
 
 
41 
 
 
THE CHOICE OF DIVESTITURE AND LONG-RUN PERFORMANCE:      
ASSET SELL-OFF VERSUS EQUITY CARVE-OUT 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The sale of a subsidiary is a major corporate breakup decision, which may enable 
a firm to refocus on its core business, to pay off debt, to do research and development on 
new products, or to finance attractive projects. A parent firm can choose to completely 
divest the subsidiary by directly selling it to an acquirer. Alternatively, it can choose to 
sell its subsidiary partially via an equity carve-out, where it sells shares of the divested 
subsidiary to the public and retains a portion, which is often significant and represents 
controlling ownership of its subsidiary. During the 1970-2006 period, asset sell-offs 
account for an average of 38% M&A (source: Mergerstat Review). Meanwhile, the total 
market value of carve-outs has an annual average of above $32 billion during the 1985-
2007 period, with a peak of $80 billion in 1993 (source: SDC).  
There are an extensive number of studies that look at the stock price reaction of 
divesting firms around the announcement dates. They have highlighted that equity carve-
outs and sales of subsidiaries to acquirers have important shareholder wealth effects for 
parents at the time of the divestiture announcement. For example, Jain (1985), Hite, 
Owers, and Rogers (1987), John and Ofek (1995), Mulherin and Boone (2000), Dittmar 
and Shivdasani (2003), and Slovin et al. (2005), among others, all report that 
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announcement returns of asset sell-offs are generally positive for selling parents. 
Similarly, Schipper and Smith (1986), Slovin et al. (1995), Allen and McConnell (1998), 
Vijh (1999), and Mulherin and Boone (2000) show that the parents of equity carve-outs 
experience positive and significant abnormal announcement returns. However, there has 
been limited research on the post-divestiture long-term performance of the divesting 
parents.  
John and Ofek (1995) look at asset-sell-off parents‟ long-run operating 
performance and they find evidence that asset sell-offs lead to an improvement in the 
post-divestiture operating performance of the parent over a period of three years. This 
increase mainly occurs in firms that increase their levels of focus. Dittmar and Shivdasani 
(2003) also document that diversified firms that divest a business segment would 
experience a reduction in the diversification discount after the divestiture, resulting from 
an improvement in the efficiency of investment for remaining divisions. However, the 
difference between the long-run returns of the divesting parents that choose different 
methods of divestiture has not received the same degree of scrutiny as the short-run 
effects of this decision. Furthermore, the factors that influence the choices of divestiture 
methods are largely unknown. In this paper, I explore the post-divestiture long-run 
performance of asset sell-off parents and equity carve-out parents and investigate the 
characteristics that lead to the choice of divestiture method.  
I conjecture that asset sell-off parents will outperform the carve-out parents in the 
long-run following a divestiture activity for three reasons. First, asset sell-off parents will 
experience a higher increase in degree of focus than equity carve-out parents, which will 
lead to a better operating performance in the long-run. While the whole subsidiary is 
43 
 
divested in an asset sell-off, the parent company often retains a controlling interest in an 
equity carve-out. Allen and McConnell (1998) report that the median retention rate is 
about 80%, while Vijh (2002) finds that parent firms often maintain 72% ownership of 
the carve-out unit. In addition, the mean (median) number of segments of U.S firms is 
relatively small, about 2.5 (3) (Source: Compustat Segment Database). For a carve-out 
parent that maintains a majority control over its carve-out unit, it is unlikely that the 
transaction will change the level of focus or the breadth of managerial responsibility of 
the parent‟s managers. Therefore, the difference between the asset sell-off parents and the 
equity carve-out parents is that the carve-out parents, on average, will have a substantial 
amount of overall remaining equity stake and therefore, more likely to have their levels 
of focus unchanged, which is important economically and may contribute to the 
difference in long-run performance between the two groups of divesting parents.  
Second, a manager whose interest is not highly aligned with that of shareholders 
will be reluctant to sell-off assets because his compensation is related to the size of the 
firm he manages (Allen and McConnell (1998)). The agency prospect comes into play 
because there is a separation between ownership and control. When an assets sale is 
required to maximize shareholder wealth, an incumbent entrenched manager will prefer 
to sell a minority stake in a subsidiary, maintaining assets under control. In support of 
this argument, Schipper and Smith (1986) provide evidence on manager‟s reluctance to 
relinquish control of the carve-out unit. They report that in the majority of cases, the CEO 
of the carve-out unit is also the manager of the parent company. Therefore, I argue that 
the managers of carve-outs are more likely to be entrenched than the managers of sell-
offs, ceteris paribus. Many studies have documented that entrenched management may be 
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attributed to a decrease in firm‟s value. For example, Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) 
empirically investigate the impact of managerial entrenchment on firm valuation. Their 
results indicate that firms with higher G index values, which reflect weaker shareholder 
rights and more entrenched management, have significantly lower firm value than those 
with lower G index values. Similarly, Bekchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell (2009) construct an 
entrenchment index and also document a negative impact of managerial entrenchment on 
firm value. Therefore, I expect that the long-run operating performance and stock excess 
returns of carve-out parents would be somewhat below those of asset sell-off parents, 
ceteris paribus. 
Third, in asset sell-off the subsidiary is completely sold to an acquirer so the size 
of the equity under the control of the parent firm‟s manager gets smaller. Therefore, the 
principal-agent problem may be reduced through an asset sell-off. On the other hand, the 
principal-agent problem is less likely to be reduced in an equity carve-out in which the 
managers often maintain controlling interest over the subsidiary. I expect that the 
reduction in principal-agent problem may be another reason for the better performance in 
long-run of asset sell-off parents. 
My paper differs from the previous studies above in that I examine the difference 
in the performance between asset sell-off parents and equity carve-out parents in each of 
the three years following the divestiture. John and Ofek (1995) only study the long-run 
performance of asset sell-off parents and Dittmar and Shivdasani (2003) only look at the 
change in the diversification discount in one year. In addition, the positive announcement 
returns for divesting parents indicate that divestitures generally create value for divesting 
parents. There are three alternative explanations that are well-documented in the literature 
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for this value creation: the increase in corporate focus, the elimination of negative 
synergies, and a better fit with the buyer. John and Ofek (1995) attribute the increase in 
the divesting firm‟s value to the increase in the firm‟s level of focus. My approach tests 
and expands John and Ofek (1995)‟s hypothesis. If a divestiture creates value through an 
increase in corporate focus, which reduces the firm‟s diversification discount, I expect 
that the long-run performance of parent firm in a complete divestiture (reduce number of 
segments and more likely to increase level of focus) should be significantly higher than 
that of parent firm of a partial divestiture (less likely to increase level of focus).  
My paper is also different from John and Ofek (1995) in that they only measure 
long-run operating performance. In addition to operating performance, I also examine 
long-run stock excess returns using three different methods: market-adjusted returns, 
non-event control firm matched by industry, size, and B/M; and a calendar time analysis 
using the Fama-French 3-factor plus momentum model. My 1983 to 2005 sample 
encompasses their 1986-1988 period, and is 6 times larger.  
I also contribute to the literature by considering an alternative explanation to the 
diversification discount. For example, firms with substantial research and development 
expenses (high R&D firms) may not suffer as much from a diversification discount. This 
is due to the fact that the diversification discount may be partly offset by the benefit from 
R&D inputs that can be shared among different segments in diversified firms and thus, 
may benefit less from the divestiture. I find that the effect of the diversification discount 
reduction on long-run performance is weaker for those firms. In examining the long-run 
buy-and-hold abnormal performance of the carve-outs, Vijh (1999) finds that all 
measures of long-run abnormal returns of carve-out units are insignificantly different 
46 
 
from zero. The study also reports that eighteen out of twenty measures of long-run excess 
returns of carve-out parents are negative but insignificant. However, the study focuses on 
explaining the results of carve-out units‟ performance and does not provide an 
explanation for the performance of the carve-out parents. Thus, given the existing 
evidence, I attempt to fill a gap in the corporate restructuring literature by examining the 
difference in performance of parent firms that choose to divest via an asset sell-off versus 
an equity carve-out. In comparing the post-divestiture performance of parents, I also 
examine factors that influence the differences in performance based on the divestiture 
choice.  
I analyze a sample of 868 asset sell-off transactions that occurred between 1983 
and 2005, and compare them to 162 equity carve-outs identified in the same period. I find 
that asset sell-off parents experience higher long-run operating performance and higher 
long-run stock excess returns than equity carve-out parents. This difference is robust to 
different approaches for measuring long-run abnormal returns. The results indicate that 
the strong post-divestiture performance may be the outcome of the reduction in the 
diversification discount. Firms that increase their focus as a result of their asset sales or as 
a result of their carve-outs (in which the parents have to relinquish its majority control of 
their subsidiaries) experience higher operating performance and higher stock long-run 
excess returns than firms that do not increase their focus. 
I also find that the effect of the reduction in diversification discount on the long-
run performance is weaker for parent firms that have high research and development 
expenses. This finding supports my hypothesis that for high R&D firms, an increase in 
focus, and therefore diversification discount reduction, may not be as beneficial as for 
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low R&D firms. A possible explanation is that in high R&D firms, the diversification 
discount may be mitigated as each additional unit receives benefit from a central research 
and development budget. Similar to my finding, Aggarwal and Zhao (2009) find that in 
some cases, the diversification discount does not hold. They argue that diversified firms 
should outperform single segment firms in industries with higher external transaction 
costs, (for example, industries where there is a severe problem of information asymmetry, 
industries where the exercise of control rights in resource shifting is difficult, and 
emergent high-tech industries). They contend that the finding of diversification discount 
depends on the firm‟s relative balance between external transaction costs and internal 
transaction costs.  
Furthermore, I examine the initial market response to divesting parents and find 
evidence that the positive market reaction to the divestiture announcement is smaller for 
the high R&D divesting parents. This finding provides further support for the view that 
high R&D firms are less vulnerable to the diversification discount. 
In addition, I examine the factors that drive the choice of divestiture method. My 
empirical findings show that parent firms‟ number of segments, a proxy for the firms‟ 
level of focus, is positively related to the probability of the asset sell-off choice. Firms 
with higher asymmetric information levels are more likely to follow the sell-off option. 
The results also illustrate that when a firm divests an unrelated unit, it is more likely to 
choose the asset sell-off method.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follow. In the next section, I review 
the related literature and present my testable hypotheses. In section 3, I present the 
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sample selection procedure and data description of the divestiture samples. Section 4 
presents and analyzes empirical results of the hypotheses. I summarize and conclude in 
section 5. 
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2. LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES 
A. Literature Review 
Many studies have examined the stock price reaction of divesting firms around 
the announcement date. These studies typically find that announcement returns are 
generally positive for asset sell-off parents (e.g., Jain (1985), Hite, Owers, and Rogers 
(1987), John and Ofek (1995), Mulherin and Boone (2000), Dittmar and Shivdasani 
(2003), and Slovin et. at. (2005)) as well as for equity carve-out parents (e.g., Schipper 
and Smith (1986), Slovin et. al. (1995), Allen and McConnell (1998), Vijh (1999), and 
Mulherin and Boone (2000)). However, the post-divestiture long-term performance of the 
divesting parents has attracted limited attention. John and Ofek (1995) find that the 
operating profitability of the asset sell-off parents increases after a divestiture, but only 
for the firms that become more focused. Dittmar and Shivdasani (2003) examine the 
investment efficiency of divesting parents and find that the asset sales are associated with 
a significant reduction of the diversification discount. They suggest that the investment 
policy for remaining divisions becomes more efficient after the divestiture. Vijh (1999) 
estimates long-term abnormal stock returns for both parents and carve-out subsidiaries 
and finds that these returns are insignificantly different from zero using a variety of 
benchmarks. However, the study focuses on the possible explanation for the performance 
of carve-out units and does not provide an explanation for the results of the carve-out 
parents.  
In this paper, I examine the differences in the long-run performance of carve-outs 
parents versus asset sell-off parents. I also attempt to explain that the determinants that 
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influence firms‟ decisions over two divestiture methods may have important implications 
for the differences in the long-run performance of the two parent groups. 
In examining divestiture choice, several studies have attempted to identify factors 
that may influence a firm‟s choice over different divestiture methods.  For example, Khan 
and Mehta (1996) find that a subsidiary with higher operating risk is divested through a 
spin-off and the one with lower operating risk is divested through a sell-off. Maydew, 
Schipper and Vincent (1999) study the impact of taxes on the decision to divest assets via 
a taxable sale rather than via a tax-free spin-off.  
The underlying motivations behind the firm decision to divest through a spin-off 
or through an equity carve-out have been explored in many studies. Shaw and Michaely 
(1995) compare determinants that may affect the choice between carve-outs and spin-offs 
of Master Limited Partnerships (MLPs). They find that spinoff units tend to be smaller 
and less profitable than carve-out firms. Frank and Harden (2001) extend Shaw and 
Michaely (1995) and find more information about firms‟ choice between carve-outs and 
spin-offs using a larger and more diverse sample of firms where the parents divest 
subsidiaries other than MLPs. They find that cash constraints, marginal tax rates, 
subsidiary profitability and the growth potential of the subsidiary‟s industry are 
significant factors associated with the two divestiture methods.  
While studies have examined different factors that may affect divestiture choices, 
factors that influence the choice between two methods of divestiture, asset sell-off and 
equity carve-out, has received less attention. A possible reason is that asset sell-offs and 
equity carve-outs are more similar, compared to spin-offs, since they both represent a 
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major change in corporate structure, ownership structure, and they both generate positive 
cash flow to the parent firms.  
A related study by Powers (2001) studied the determinants that affect firm‟s 
choice among the three divestiture mechanisms (equity carve-out, spinoff, and asset sell-
off). They conclude that the parent‟s need for external financing and managerial 
incentives may be factors that determine the divestiture method. However, those factors 
mainly influence a firm‟s decision over choosing between a spinoff and the other two 
methods of divestiture. These factors are not as relevant in influencing a firm‟s decision 
to conduct an equity carve-out or a sell-off. For example, they find that both asset sell-off 
and equity carve-out parents (who receive cash) have higher leverage and also have 
worse operating performance than spin-off parents, suggesting they need more external 
capital than spin-off parents. In addition, they argue that managers who value private 
benefits and compensation will not favor the spin-off method over the other two 
divestiture methods, because spin-offs generate no cash and reduce the size of the firm. In 
this paper, I provide further analysis of the divestiture method choice by identifying 
factors that influence the two more closely-related types of divestiture methods: carve-out 
versus sell-off. 
B.  Testable Hypotheses 
i. Long-run Performance 
Because an asset sell-off will completely separate the unit from its parent, this 
divestiture method is more likely to reduce the firm‟s number of segments and increase 
the firm‟s level of focus. As a result, the firm will benefit from the reduction of its 
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diversification discount. On the other hand, the equity carve-out is not an effective 
method of increasing focus because the parent often retains a controlling interest and the 
divested unit is more likely to be related. Therefore, it may not get much benefit from the 
reduction of diversification discount. I hypothesize that the long-run performance of 
parents, measured both in operating and stock performance, following selloffs would be 
higher than that of carve-out parent, because of the difference in their diversification 
discount reduction. 
Hypothesis 1a: The long-run operating performance of asset sell-off parents is 
significantly higher than the long-run operating performance of equity carve-out parents.  
Hypothesis 1b: The long-run abnormal stock returns of asset sell-off parents are 
significantly higher than the long-run abnormal stock returns of equity carve-out parents.  
ii.  Diversification discount exception 
If the diversification discount helps to explain the better performance of parents in 
asset sell-offs versus carve-outs, then the difference in performance based on divestiture 
choice should be less evident for parent firms that are less vulnerable to a diversification 
discount. For example, firms with substantial research and development (high R&D 
firms) do not suffer as much from a diversification discount, and thus, should benefit less 
from the divestiture since they did not have as much of a diversification discount in the 
first place. Following Aggarwal and Zhao (2009), one possible explanation is that in high 
R&D firms, the diversification discount may be reduced by the benefit that each 
additional unit receives from a central research and development expenditure as R&D 
inputs can be shared among different segments in diversified firms. I expect the effect of 
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focus increasing (diversification discount reduction) on long-run performance to be 
weaker for those firms. On the other hand, low R&D parents may benefit more from the 
divestiture since they can reduce their diversification discount to a greater extent. 
Hypothesis 2: High R&D firms do not suffer as much from a diversification 
discount, and thus, should benefit less from a divestiture in their long-run performance. 
iii. R&D effect on the market reaction at divestiture announcement dates. 
If high R&D firms do not suffer as much from a diversification discount, and 
thus, benefit less from a divestiture, I expect different immediate market reactions on 
divestiture announcement dates for firms with different levels of research and 
development intensity. Specifically, I predict that firms with a higher level of R&D 
expenses would experience lower announcement abnormal returns, while firms with 
lower level of R&D expenses would receive higher announcement abnormal returns. 
 Hypothesis 3: The divestiture announcement excess returns are negatively related 
to the parent firm‟s level of research and development. 
iv. Level of focus 
Berger and Ofek (1995) find that a reduction in a firm‟s level of diversification, or 
in other words, an increase in its level of focus, may contribute to an increase in its value. 
Because asset sell-offs result in a complete separation between the parent and its 
subsidiary, this divestiture method increase the parent firm‟s level of focus (and 
consequently increase value through the reduction of diversification discount) when the 
divested unit is an unrelated one. Therefore, I predict that an asset sell-off will be more 
54 
 
likely to be the choice when a firm divests an unrelated business segment. On the other 
hand, in equity carve-outs, where only a partial of the divested unit is sold and the parent 
often retain a controlling interest over the unit, equity carve-out is preferred to asset sell-
off when the parent divests a related unit because of the benefits gained from synergy 
when the divested unit is operating in industries that are related to the parent‟s main 
operations. Also, because a parent that maintains majority control over its carve-out 
subsidiary is less likely to be able to focus more on its core operations, equity carve-out is 
not an effective method of increasing focus and may not provide much benefit from the 
reduction of the diversification discount. Therefore, I expect that parent firms that have a 
greater need for a focus-increasing transaction are the ones that will not opt for the equity 
carve-out method. 
Hypothesis 4: The asset sell-off is more likely to be chosen over the carve-out 
method for unrelated subsidiary and for parent firms with low pre-divestiture level of 
focus. 
My measurements for level of focus include three variables: the total number of 
non-trivial (at least accounted for 10% of the total sales) business segments reported by 
the firm, the sales-based Herfindahl Index, and the asset-based Herfindahl Index across 
the firm‟s business segments. A higher number of business segments indicates a lower 
level of focus and Higher Herfindahl Index indicates a higher level of focus. I expect that 
when a firm divests, the probability that it will choose the asset sell-off method over the 
carve-out method is positively related to its pre-divestiture number of segments and 
negatively related to its pre-divestiture Herfindahl Indexes. I use two dummy variables to 
indicate whether the divested unit is related to its parent‟s core business. Relate2 and 
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Relate3 each takes the value of one when the divested division and the parent are both 
operating in related industries (they share the same two or three digit SIC code) and zero 
otherwise. 
v. Level of information asymmetry 
Firms with high levels of asymmetric information may find capital markets 
difficult to access because of strict SEC disclosure requirements. In particular, a firm that 
wants to carve-out its unit has to file a prospectus in which it analyzes and discloses the 
carve-out‟s financial viability. In addition, it is more costly for firms with high 
asymmetric information to send a signal of its true value to the public market. Therefore, 
the buyer‟s ability to value the assets being divested plays a critical role in the parent 
firm's decision on the method to divest. In support of this prediction, John and Ofek 
(1995) show that three-quarters of divested segments are unrelated to the parent‟s core 
business (using four-digit Standard Industry Classification (SIC) code) in asset sell-offs. 
Since public investors are usually not well-informed about the divested unit's value and 
may not have expert knowledge of the carve-out unit‟s business, they are less likely to 
subscribe to an equity carve-out when asymmetric information of the parent firm is high. 
In support of this argument, Ellingsen and Rydquist (1997) argue that a manager who has 
negative information about a firm‟s prospect is less likely to go public. Chemmanur and 
Fulghieri (1999) find that, because in an IPO, the firm sells shares to a larger number of 
investors, those investors must be convinced about the value of the firm. On the other 
hand, an acquirer in an asset sell-off can value the assets better than the majority of 
public investors because they may operate in the same industry or they are willing to 
incur some costs to gather information about the asset they intend to buy. Therefore, I 
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expect that firms that have high asymmetric information and are more difficult to value 
will be more likely to divest via the sell-off method. In contrast, firms that are more 
easily valued by public investors are more likely to divest via an equity carve-out.  
Hypothesis 5: A parent firm‟s pre-divestiture level of information asymmetry is 
positively related to the probability that it will choose the asset sell-off method over the 
carve-out method when it divests. 
I use two sets of variables to measure a firm‟s level of asymmetric information. 
One set is constructed based on its financial characteristics. It includes the firm‟s size and 
the ratio of intangible assets over total assets. I hypothesize that the higher the values of 
intangibles assets relative to total assets, the more uncertain a large set of investors will 
be regarding the value of the firm‟s total assets as well as the value of its subsidiary 
assets. In this case, a firm may find it easier to persuade one buyer about its subsidiary 
asset value in an asset sell-off than to persuade a larger set of investors in an equity 
carve-out. Also, I expect that information about larger firms is generally more available 
to public investors than smaller firms.  
I also proxy for asymmetric information based on analysts‟ earnings forecast data 
from the I/B/E/S History Summary File. The more analysts that follow a firm, the more 
information is generated leading to less asymmetric information. I expect that a firm‟s 
pre-divestiture degree of analyst coverage is negatively related to the probability that it 
will choose the asset sell-off method over the carve-out method when it divests. In 
addition, analysts‟ forecast errors (as a proxy for level of inaccuracy) and forecast 
dispersion (as a proxy for analyst uncertainty) are widely used in the literature (e.g., 
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Krishnaswami and Subramaniam (1999), Kang and Liu (2008), and Aggarwal and Zhao 
(2009), among many others) as measures of a firm‟s information environment. I calculate 
analyst earnings forecast error (FE) as the absolute value of the difference between mean 
earnings forecast and actual earnings, divided by the price per share at the end of the 
month in which earnings information is released. I define analyst earnings forecast 
dispersion (DISPER) as the standard deviation of earnings forecasts scaled by the price 
per share at the end of the month in which earnings information is released. Both 
variables FE and DISPER are expected to be positively related to a level of information 
asymmetry. Therefore, I predict that when a firm divests, its pre-divestiture measures of 
analyst forecast error and forecast dispersion are positively related to the probability that 
it will choose the asset sell-off over the carve-out. 
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3. DATA SOURCES AND SAMPLE SELECTION 
I select two subsamples: an asset sell-off parent sample and an equity carve-out 
parent sample. The subsample of firms that divest via asset sell-off is obtained from the 
SDC Mergers and Acquisitions database, and the subsample of firms that divest via 
equity carve-outs is drawn from the SDC Global New Issues database. An acquisition is 
classified as an asset sell-off if the acquired target is a subsidiary, division, or branch of 
another firm at the time of the acquisition announcement. An initial public offering is 
classified as an equity carve-out if the issuing firm is a subsidiary of another firm at and 
before the time of the offering. I examine divesting transactions over the period of 1983- 
2005. For both types of deals, I exclude all transactions in which the deal value (for asset 
sell-off transactions) or the proceeds (for carve-out transactions) is $100 million or lower. 
I impose this size requirement to ensure the transaction is economically significant and to 
make the two samples comparable, because if the size of a divested unit is too small, the 
divesting parent may have no option but to divest this asset through an asset sell-off. 
In order to be included in my sample, I further require three more screening 
criteria. First, I require that each divesting parent in the sample has at least 2 consecutive 
years of financial data available from the Center for Research in Security Prices and from 
Compustat. I collect financial and accounting variables for each divesting parent at the 
end of the year prior to the transaction from Compustat. I exclude firms if they are 
missing data for total assets, sale (revenue), total liabilities, net cash flow, or short-term 
debt. Market values of equity and abnormal returns around the transaction time are 
retrieved from CRSP. Second, the deal value and the percentage of shares acquired must 
be available in SDC Mergers and Acquisitions database. Third, the proceeds and the 
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percent being spun off have to be available on SDC Global New Issues database. Analyst 
earnings forecasts, actual earnings and number of earning forecasts data are obtained 
from I/B/E/S History Summary File. Segment information is obtained from Compustat‟s 
Segment database. My final sample of corporate divestiture consists of 868 asset sell-offs 
and 162 equity carve-outs.  
The distribution of equity carve-outs and asset sell-offs in my sample over time 
and among industries is shown in table 2.1. I follow the Fama-French 17 industry 
classification procedure. I observe a higher frequency of divesting events among parent 
firms operating in food, oil and petroleum, drugs, machinery, transportation, utilities, 
finance and retail stores. Within my sample period, the highest frequency of transactions 
happens in the year 2000 (86 transactions), 2005 (73 transactions), 1999 (71 transactions), 
and 2004 (68 transactions), mostly influenced by the number of asset sell-off transaction 
in those years. The rest of the transactions are evenly distributed among other years.  I 
also provide the market values of the divested unit in both the asset sell-off sample and 
the equity carve-out sample. I measure the market value of the carve-out unit as the 
proceeds amount of the issue, divided by the percent of issuer/subsidiary that is being 
sold in the equity carve-out. The market value of the sell-off unit is measured by the total 
value of consideration paid by the acquirer, excluding fees and expenses, divided by the 
percentage of shares acquired in the transaction. The average and the median market 
value of the asset sell-off units in my sample are $429 million and $472 million, 
respectively. On the other hand, the average and the median market value of the equity 
carve-out units in my sample are $655 million and $564 million, respectively. Both the 
average and median market value of a unit being carved-out in my sample is higher than 
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those of a unit being sold-off. However, in most of the years they are comparable and the 
difference is not economically significant. 
Table 2.2 describes the proportion of the divested units compared to the divesting 
parent firms. On average, the asset sell-off units account for about 18.6% of their parent 
market values while the carve-out units account for 21.3% of their parent market values. 
However, their median values are about the same, which are about 33.6% and 31.1% for 
the two groups, respectively. As shown in this table, firms sell about one-fifth to one-
third of their total assets in the average transaction.  
This table provides the mean of accounting, financial, and other firm-specific 
variables that are expected to have an influence on the divestiture method for equity 
carve-outs parents as well as asset sell-offs parents. Variables are collected for each 
divesting parent at the fiscal year end proceeding the year in which the transaction 
occurs. In general, the mean values suggest that divesting firms in both samples are not 
significantly different in basic financial characteristics. They are comparable in market-
to-book ratio, have similar leverage as well as operating margins. In addition, their 
research and development expenses are similar to each other, both are around 2.5% of 
their total assets; their divested units both account for about one-fifth of the parent‟s total 
assets.  
On average, asset sell-off parents have a higher number of business segments 
(2.95) prior to the divestiture activity compared to carve-out parents (2.48). The 
difference between the pre-divestiture numbers of segments of the two parent groups is 
statistically significant at a 5% level of confidence. The result is consistent with 
Hypothesis 4 as I expect that firms with a higher number of business lines should suffer 
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more from the diversification discount and, therefore, should have a greater need for a 
focus-increasing transaction. Therefore, they are more likely to choose the asset sell-off 
method. In addition, both the pre-divestiture sales-based Herfindahl Index average (0.58) 
and the assets-based Herfindahl Index average (0.59) for the asset-sell-off parents are 
significantly (at 10% level of confidence) smaller than those of the carve-out parents 
(0.69). Table 2.3 also shows that the mean values of Relate2 and Relate3 (equals to one if 
the divested unit and the parent share the same two or three digit SIC code) for asset sell-
off transactions are 0.33 and 0.22, respectively, which are significantly lower than their 
mean values of equity carve-out transactions (0.44 and 0.3, respectively).  
I also report statistics for different measurements of the parent firms‟ asymmetric 
information level in table 2.3. The average number of analyst coverage for the asset sell-
off parents is 10, which is significantly lower than the analyst coverage of 12 for the 
carve-out parents. The mean values of earnings forecast error and earnings forecast 
dispersion variables of the asset sell-off parents are all significantly higher than those of 
the carve-out parents at a 1% level of confidence. In addition, the intangible asset ratio of 
the asset sell-off parents is 14.9%, which is significantly higher (at a 1% level of 
confidence) than the 8.9% ratio of the equity carve-out parents. Finally, table 2.3 
indicates that the market values of the carve-out parents are higher than the market values 
of the asset sell-off parents.  
  
62 
 
4. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
A. Post divestiture long-run performance of Parent Firms in Equity Carve-out and 
Asset Sell-off 
In this section, I examine the ex-post performance of the parent firms in asset sell-
off and equity carve-out samples. If parent firms opt for a complete separation via a sell-
off when the benefit from a focus increasing transaction is higher, then I expect that the 
long-run abnormal performance of the asset sell-off parent firms should be higher than 
that of the equity carve-out parent firms. The difference in long-run performance may 
result from a decrease in the diversification discount as a result of having a fewer number 
of segments. I measure both the divesting parents‟ long-run operating performance as 
well as their long-run stock returns. I use three different approaches for measuring the 
long-run abnormal stock returns of a divesting parent. First, the long-run excess return of 
a firm is calculated as the geometric stock return for the firm minus the CRSP value-
weighted return (I also report the result using CRSP equally-weighted return) during the 
same period. Second, I compute the long-run abnormal stock return as the mean 
difference in the stock price performance between the event-firm‟s and non-event 
benchmark firm‟s buy-and hold over periods that extend from 1 to 4 years. I select a non-
event benchmark firm using the following matching criteria: size, market-to-book, and 
industry affiliation. Third, I measure long-run abnormal stock returns using the Fama-
French (1993) three factor plus momentum model, using weighted least square method to 
estimate the parameters of the model. This methodology is recommended in Fama (1998) 
and then used by Longhran and Ritter (1995), Brav and Gompers (1997), and Liu, 
Szewczyk and Zantout (2008) to measure long-term abnormal returns. In all three 
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different approaches, I exclude the returns in the month of event announcement dates. 
The exclusion is justified in Vijh (1999). 
i) Operating Performance 
I, following John and Ofek (1995), and Boone et al. (2003), compare the return on 
assets of two divesting parent groups, measured as the earnings before interest, taxes, and 
depreciation (EBITDA) to book value of assets, to test whether there is a significant 
difference between the profitability of asset sell-off parents versus equity carve-out 
parents. In the year of the divestiture, results of the divested units are not reflected in the 
parent‟s EBITDA, but are reported separately in the financial statements. I calculate the 
difference in returns on assets between asset sell-off parents and equity carve-out parents 
in the divestiture year, year zero, and examine how this difference changes in years 1, 2, 
and 3. I expect that the change in the difference between two groups of divesting parents‟ 
long-run operating performance may be the result of different divestiture method choices.  
Table 2.4 shows that in year 0, the asset sell-off parents are performing equally to 
the equity carve-out parents. In general, an asset sell-off parent becomes significantly 
more profitable in each of the three years following the divestiture, even after adjusting 
by the firm‟s industry median operating performance. On the other hand, an equity carve-
out parent either experiences negative return on assets or insignificant return, adjusting 
by the median return on assets in the parent firm‟s industry. More importantly, the 
difference in operating performance between the two divesting parent groups is 
statistically significant for all three years following the divestiture. Furthermore, this 
result is not due to biases based on differences in performance for the two parents‟ 
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industries. The results in table 2.4 support Hypothesis 1a that asset sell-off parents have 
higher operating performance than equity carve-out parents. 
ii) Stock Price Performance 
a. The excess return method 
Table 2.5 reports the long-term average excess return (AER) over periods that 
extend from 1 to 3 years following the divestiture events. The excess return (ER) for each 
event firm is calculated as the geometric return for the firm minus the CRSP value-
weighted return for the same period. As shown in table 2.5, I find statistically significant 
negative post-announcement abnormal stock returns to the equity carve-out parent firms 
over the second year, the third years and over the 3-year period. These findings are 
consistent with the finding in Vijh (1999). I also find statistically significant positive 
post-announcement abnormal stock returns to the asset sell-off parent firms over the 
second year, the third year and over the 3 year period. From year 1 to year 3, the long-run 
abnormal return to the asset sell-off parents are always statistically higher than that of the 
carve-out parents. This finding is consistent with my Hypothesis 1b in section II that asset 
sell-off parent firms have higher benefits, compared to carve-out parents, from focus 
increasing transactions and therefore, have higher long-run abnormal returns than equity 
carve-out parent firms. 
b. The matching method 
In this method, I compute the long-run abnormal stock return of an asset sell-off 
(equity carve-out) parent firm and then compare its stock price performance to that of a 
matched firm over the holding periods. I use the following matching criteria: (1) firm 
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size; (2) industry affiliation; and (3) book-to-market ratio. I select the matched firm as the 
one with the closest book-to-market ratio from the list of non-event firms operating in the 
same industry. From this group, I choose the firm with a the market value of equity that is 
between 60% and 140% of that for the event firm as of 1 month before the announcement 
date. None of the matched firms sell-off (carve-out) its unit during the period from 3 
years before to 3 years after the event date. When a matched firm is delisted before the 
end of the holding period, the next best matched firm is substituted on the delisting date.  
After matching the equity carve-out (asset sell-off) parent firms with non-event 
benchmark firms, I follow Barber and Lyon (1997) to calculate the holding period 
abnormal return for a firm as: 
BHARi,a,b= ∏
b
t=a  (Ri,t+ 1) - ∏
b
t=a  (Rm,t +1), 
where BHARi,a,b represents the excess return for event firm i over the time period 
from month a to month b, Rit is the return of event firm i on month t, and Rmt is the return 
of the matched firm on month t. I compute the buy-and-hold average abnormal returns 
(BHAAR) over holding periods that extend from 1 to 4 years. None of the buy and hold 
periods include the month of the announcement date. If an event firm is delisted before 
the end of a buy-and-hold period, its truncated return series is still included in the 
analysis, and it is assumed to earn the monthly return of the bench mark for the remainder 
of the period. The statistical significance of each of the BHAR is tested using the 
parametric t-test (two tailed), based on the cross-sectional standard deviations. 
Table 2.6 describes the post-announcement buy and hold average stock returns 
using the matching method. Consistent with the results obtained from the excess return 
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method, I find statistically significant negative post-announcement buy-and-hold 
abnormal stock returns to equity carve-out parent firms over the periods of 3 years and 4 
years. Meanwhile, I find statistically significant positive post-announcement buy-and-
hold abnormal stock returns to asset sell-off parent firms over the periods of 2 years, 3 
years and 4 years. These abnormal returns are statistically significant at the 5% level or 
1% level. The buy-and-hold abnormal returns of the asset sell-off parents are always 
significantly higher than those of the equity carve-out parents. The difference in long-run 
abnormal performance between the two divesting samples accumulates from 16% over a 
2 year period to about 33% over the 4 year period. The results of table 2.6 strongly give 
support to Hypothesis 1b. 
c. The rolling portfolio method 
I estimate the post-announcement long-run abnormal returns for equity carve-out 
(asset sell-off) parent firms using the rolling portfolio method, which is recommended in 
Fama (1998) and used by Loughran and Ritter (1995), Brav and Gompers (1997), and 
Liu, Szewczyk and Zantout (2008). For every calendar month, I compute the equally and 
value-weighted returns on the portfolio of all firms that carve-out (sell-off) their units 
during the preceding 12, 24, 36 or 48 calendar months. Then, I use the calendar time 
event-portfolio returns in the following Fama and French (1993) three factor model plus 
momentum factor to estimate the abnormal return of the rolling portfolio: 
Rp,t– Rf,t= αp + βp (Rm,t– Rf,t) + spSMBt + hpHMLt + mpUMDt +ep,t, 
where Rp,t represents the return on the event portfolio in the month t; Rf,t is the 1-
month U.S. Treasury bill rate in month t; Rm,t is the return on the valued-weighted index 
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of all NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ listed stocks in month t; SMBt is the difference 
between the returns on portfolios of small and big stocks (below or above the NYSE 
median value) with the same weighted average book-to-market value of equity ratio in 
month t; HMLt is the difference between the returns on portfolios of high and low book-
to-market value of equity ratio (above and below the 0.7 and 0.3 fractiles) with about the 
same weighted average size in month t; and UMDt is the difference between the returns 
on up and down return portfolios that mimic the momentum risk factor. The intercept αp 
is then interpreted as the average monthly abnormal return of the event portfolio across 
all 24, 36 or 48 months. 
Because the number of asset sell-off (equity carve-out) parent firms that are 
included in the rolling event portfolio changes over time, I use the weighted least squares 
(WLS) methods to estimate the four factor model‟s parameters. The weights I use in the 
WLS model are the number of event firms in the monthly portfolio. The rolling portfolio 
returns are calculated both equally and value-weighted using the market values of the 
firms in the rolling portfolio as of the end of the month before the event date as the 
weighting vector. I have 274 calendar month portfolio return observations, as the 
sampling period is from March 1983 through December 2005. 
Table 2.7 presents the post-announcement average abnormal monthly stock return 
estimated using the rolling portfolio returns and the Fama and French (1993) three-factor 
plus momentum model. I estimate returns as the value-weighted average of returns of 
firms in the rolling portfolio. I find most of the measures of post-announcement abnormal 
stock returns to the equity carve-out parent firms over the periods from 2 to 4 years are 
negative, although generally insignificantly different from zero. The long-run stock 
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abnormal returns become positive over the periods of 3 and 4 years if portfolio returns 
are calculated using the value weighted method. On the other hand, I find that seven out 
of eight measures of the post-announcement abnormal stock returns to the asset sell-off 
parent firms are positive and significantly different from zero over the periods of 1 year, 
2 years, 3 years, and 4 years. Consistent with my other measures of long-run 
performance, the differences between the long-run excess returns of these two groups of 
parents are always positive and significant, yielding further support Hypothesis 1b.  
B. Regression Analysis of the Post-announcement Long-term Buy-and-Hold 
Abnormal Returns  
The above results indicate that the long-run performance of asset sell-off parent 
firms is significantly higher than that of the equity carve-out parent firms in most of the 
models. One reason may be that many asset sell-offs result in an increases in the parent 
firms‟ level of focus, which in turn leads to a reduction in its diversification discount. In 
this section, I make an effort to see whether this increase in focus can explain the results I 
find in part A of this section. To explore this issue, I model the post announcement buy-
and-hold abnormal return of divesting parent firms (both asset sell-off parents and equity 
carve-out parents) as a function of explanatory factors, including a Focus dummy 
variable that takes the value of 1 if there is an increase in the parent firm‟s level of focus 
following the divestiture event (unrelated asset sell-off and relinquish-control unrelated 
equity carve-out) and zero otherwise. In explaining the difference in post-divestiture 
performance of carve-out and sell-off parents, one may argue that part of what may be 
driving the long-run performance, in addition to the increase in level of focus, is the post-
divestiture activities of the parent firms.  For example, the parent firm may become an 
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acquirer. If this is the case, then the firm‟s long run performance will be affected as many 
studies have documented that acquirers generally suffer from negative long-run abnormal 
returns. Therefore, I control for whether a parent firm became an acquirer within a year 
after the divestiture. I include a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the 
divesting parent becomes an acquirer within one year after the divestiture and zero 
otherwise. I also control for the relative size between the subsidiary and its parent 
because as the size of the subsidiary increases relative to its parent, the diversification 
discount may decrease even more, resulting in better long-run performance.  
In regression1 of table 2.8, the coefficient on the asset sell-off dummy variable is 
positive significant at the 5% level of confidence. The multivariate result is consistent 
with the findings in previous tables and supports my hypothesis that asset sell-off parents 
experience higher long-run returns than parents of equity carve-outs.  In regression 2 of 
table 2.8, the coefficient on the focus dummy variable is significant and positive at the 
10% level. This finding indicates that for transactions that result in an increase in the 
firm‟s corporate focus, the divesting parent firms‟ long-run buy-and-hold abnormal stock 
returns are 22% higher than those of divesting parent firms in transactions that do not 
experience such an increase, regardless of whether the transaction is an asset sell-off or a 
carve-out. Therefore, one reason for the better long-run performance of parents following 
sell-offs, as opposed to carve-outs, may be their reduction in the diversification discount 
that is associated with a higher level of focus.  
I further explore this issue by examining Hypothesis 2 to see if the parent firm's 
pre-divestiture level of R&D expenses can affect its long-run abnormal performance. 
Perhaps higher R&D parent firms do not benefit as much from the sell-off since they did 
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not suffer as much of a diversification discount in the first place. In those high R&D 
firms, the marginal R&D benefits that each additional unit gets from central R&D may 
outweigh the marginal R&D costs associated with having one additional unit. Therefore, 
in those firms, the net gain from R&D of each additional unit may compensate for part of 
the loss from diversification discount of each additional unit. Regression 3 tests this 
hypothesis by including an interaction variable between the focus dummy and the high-
R&D dummy. I expect the effect of focus-increasing (diversification discount reduction) 
on long-run performance should be weaker for those high R&D firms. I find that the 
coefficient on the interaction variable in regression 2 is significant and negative at a 10% 
level of confidence. In support of Hypothesis 2, this finding suggests that high R&D 
firms do not suffer as much from a diversification discount, and thus, benefit less from 
the sell-off. Also, I do not find evidence that divesting parents that become acquirers 
following a divestiture significantly underperform those who do not engage in that 
activity. 
C. Regression Analysis of the Divestiture Announcement Abnormal Returns  
Because the results in table 2.8 indicates that high R&D firms do not benefit 
much in the long-run following a divestiture because they may not suffer as much from a 
diversification discount in the first place, I expect stronger market reactions at divestiture 
announcement dates for divesting parents with lower levels of R&D expenses. 
Specifically, I predict that firms with higher levels of R&D expenses would experience 
lower announcement abnormal returns relative to firms with lower levels of R&D 
expenses, because low R&D firms are expected to benefit more from the higher reduction 
in the diversification discount. To test this hypothesis, I regress the divesting parent‟s 
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excess return at divestiture announcement on a set of explanatory variables, including an 
interaction variable between the focus dummy and the high-R&D dummy. The average 
market reaction is 2.9%, which is similar to 2.6% of Mulherin and Boone (200) or 3.4% 
of Dittmar and Shivdasani (2003). The results in table 2.9 indicate that that the coefficient 
on the interaction variable is significantly negative at the 10% level of confidence, which 
supports Hypothesis 3. The finding suggests that the market reacts differently to firms 
with different level of research and development expenses when the divestiture 
announcement news is released.  
D. Regression Analysis of the Factors that influence the Choices of Divestiture 
Methods  
I estimate logistic regressions to provide a robust analysis of the determinants on 
the choice of divestiture method. I model the dependent variable as a binomial choice 
variable of zero for equity carve-out transactions and of one for asset sell-off transactions. 
I employ a logistic regression methodology and estimate the following model: 
[1 if asset sell-off and 0 if equity carve-out] 
= αi+ βilevel of focus factors 
+ βirelatedness factors 
+ βilevel of information asymmetry factors 
+ βifirm characteristics + εi,  
where the dependent variable equals one when the divestiture is an asset sell-off 
and zero when it is an equity carve-out. The explanatory variables are discussed in part B 
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of section II. The results are shown in table 2.10. I also include, but do not report, dummy 
variables that control for the firm and industry fixed effects.  
In model 1, the coefficient for the pre-divestiture parent firm‟s number of 
business segments is positive and significantly different from zero, which suggests that 
firms with a higher number of segments are more likely to divest through an asset sell-
off. This result supports Hypothesis 4, indicating that firms with a greater need for 
increasing their focus are more likely to opt for a divestiture via a sell-off. In model 2, the 
coefficient for the parent‟s pre-divestiture sales-based Herfindahl Index is positive and 
statistically significant. The result remains the same when I use the asset-based 
Herfindahl Index, consistent with Hypothesis 4. In model 3, the coefficient on the Relate2 
variable is negative and significantly different from zero. Thus, this result suggests that 
firms often divest a related unit via an equity care-out because there are synergies 
between the parent and division when they are operating in the same industry, and those 
synergies are better maintained with a carve-out where the parent still has a significant 
relationship with its unit. The result does not change when I use Relate3 variable instead. 
This finding also provides support for Hypothesis 4. 
The findings also show that a firm‟s level of information asymmetry is positively 
related to the likelihood that it will opt for the asset sell-off method over the equity carve-
out method when it divests. Specifically, models 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8 show these results, 
which are consistent with Hypothesis 5. The coefficients on the degree of analyst 
coverage and firm‟s size are both negative, while the coefficients on analyst earnings 
forecast error, earning forecast dispersion, and intangible asset ratio are all positive, also 
in support of Hypothesis 5. Most of the coefficients are statistically significant and only 
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two coefficients on degree of analyst coverage and earnings forecast dispersion are 
insignificantly different from zero. Perhaps the standard deviation of earnings forecast is 
a good proxy for the consensus among analysts, but not for information asymmetry.  For 
example, low standard deviation of earnings forecast purely means high level of 
consensus among analysts, but the earnings forecast error can still be either high or low, 
which indicates either high or low level of informational asymmetry. In addition, the 
number of analysts following the firm may be a good proxy for the supply of information 
about the firm, but it can provide little information in case of a herding behavior in which 
one analyst is making his estimation based on the estimation of another analyst. 
Finally, the coefficients on the market value of divesting parents are always 
negative and significantly different from zero in all models from 1 to 9. The results are 
consistent with Hypothesis 5 which implies that public investors will find it easier to get 
information of a big firm compared to a smaller one, and therefore, carve-out may be an 
effective method.  In general, the results from my logistic regressions support the 
hypotheses in section II for most proxies. 
Model 10 captures the influence of R&D. While the results in previous models 
suggest that firms with a higher number of segments are more likely to divest through an 
asset sell-off, this finding does not hold for firms that invest significantly in research and 
development. Surprisingly, for these types of firms, the likelihood for a firm to choose 
the asset sell-off method is decreasing with its number of segments. A possible 
explanation for this finding is that the division of an intensive R&D firm will benefit 
through centralized R&D research. The higher the number of the firm‟s business 
segments, the higher the total benefits of R&D inputs that are shared among its various 
74 
 
segments. Thus, this type of firm is less vulnerable to the diversification discount and, 
thus, benefits less from the increase in level of focus. 
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5. CONCLUSION 
The sale of a subsidiary is a major corporate restructuring decision which may 
help firms to improve operating efficiency, to increase cash flow, to expand production or 
to reduce informational asymmetry. Prior studies typically report a positive cumulative 
abnormal stock return around the announcement time for both equity carve-out and assets 
sell-off parents. Yet, the post-divestiture long-term performance of the divesting parents 
has received less scrutiny. In this paper, I examine the effect of the divestiture choice on 
the long-run performance of the divesting parent firms as well as the underlying factors 
that may influence this choice. 
Examining a sample of 868 asset sell-off transactions and 162 equity carve-out 
transactions between 1983 and 2005, I find that both long-term operating performance 
and long-term abnormal stock returns are statistically higher for asset sell-off parents than 
for equity carve-out parents. The finding is robust to different measurements of long-term 
abnormal returns. I also find evidence that the difference in post-divestiture long-term 
performance is affected by the reduction in the diversification discount. Firms that 
increase their focus as results of their asset sales experience higher long-run stock returns 
than firms that do not increase their focus. 
I also document that the diversification discount may be less prevalent for certain 
types of firms. In particular, the amount of diversification discount reduction depends on 
the firm‟s level of R&D expenses because the diversification discount may be mitigated 
by the benefit that each division receives from a central research and development 
expenses. I find that the market reaction is stronger at divestiture announcement dates for 
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divesting parents with lower levels of R&D expenses. In addition, the results also 
indicate that those firm experience higher long-run performance. The results imply that 
the level of a firm‟s R&D is an important factor to consider when measuring the 
diversification discount effect following a divestiture. Future research could explore other 
firm characteristics that alleviate or even eliminate the diversification discount. 
My empirical results further show that parent firms‟ number of segments, a proxy 
for the firms‟ level of focus, is positively related to the probability of the asset sell-off 
choice. In addition, firms with higher asymmetric information levels are more likely to 
follow the sell-off option. The results also illustrate that when a firm divests an unrelated 
unit, it more likely to choose the asset sell-off method, consistent with the long-run 
findings. 
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Table 2.1 Sample distributions by year and industry 
 
Panel A: By year 
 
 Equity Carve-out  Asset sell-off 
Year N Percent Mean Median N Percent Mean Median 
1983 10 6.2% $174  $172  2 0.2% 
$340 $300 
1984 5 3.1% $54  $43  5 0.6% 
$564 $760 
1985 3 1.9% $671  $400  20 2.3% 
$678 $360 
1986 9 5.6% $90  $88  16 1.8% 
$322 $641 
1987 9 5.6% $411  $101  25 2.9% 
$296 $476 
1988 6 3.7% $217  $205  25 2.9% 
$413 $370 
1989 4 2.5% $348  $131  37 4.3% 
$330 $390 
1990 4 2.5% $361  $221  22 2.5% 
$295 $458 
1991 6 3.7% $363  $65  24 2.8% 
$471 $560 
1992 12 7.4% $188  $105  25 2.9% 
$889 $1,100 
1993 11 6.8% $662  $194  23 2.6% 
$307 $177 
1994 9 5.6% $194  $70  26 3.0% 
$429 $409 
1995 7 4.3% $314  $247  31 3.6% 
$215 $130 
1996 15 9.3% $513  $243  40 4.6% 
$246 $569 
1997 8 4.9% $296  $150  56 6.5% 
$597 $385 
1998 8 4.9% $259  $315  53 6.1% 
$328 $430 
1999 12 7.4% $698  $990  59 6.8% 
$487 $600 
2000 8 4.9% $2,545  $2,841  78 9.0% 
$373 $558 
2001 8 4.9% $626  $528  57 6.6% 
$606 $650 
2002 2 1.2% $937  $937  52 6.0% 
$362 $362 
2003 1 0.6% $1,583  $1,583  56 6.5% 
$361 $361 
2004 2 1.2% $2,550  $2,550  66 7.6% 
$414 $414 
2005 3 1.9% $1,021  $791  70 8.1% 
$551 $407 
Total 162  
$655 $564 
868  
$429 $472 
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Panel B: By Industry 
 
Industry Equity Carve-out Asset Sell-off Total 
 Frequency Percent Frequency Percent Frequency Percent 
Food 5 3.1% 38 4.4% 43 4.2% 
Mining and Minerals 3 1.9% 8 0.9% 11 1.1% 
Oil and Petroleum 5 3.1% 41 4.7% 46 4.5% 
Textiles and Apparel 2 1.2% 6 0.7% 8 0.8% 
Consumer Durables 3 1.9% 15 1.7% 18 1.7% 
Chemicals 5 3.1% 24 2.8% 29 2.8% 
Drugs 9 5.6% 47 5.4% 56 5.4% 
Construction 4 2.5% 15 1.7% 19 1.8% 
Steel 2 1.2% 15 1.7% 17 1.7% 
Fabricated Products 0 0.0% 5 0.6% 5 0.5% 
Machinery 19 11.7% 98 11.3% 117 11.4% 
Automobiles 6 3.7% 26 3.0% 32 3.1% 
Transportation 8 4.9% 55 6.3% 63 6.1% 
Utilities 7 4.3% 46 5.3% 53 5.1% 
Retail Stores 11 6.8% 32 3.7% 43 4.2% 
Finance 22 13.6% 147 16.9% 169 16.4% 
Others 49 30.2% 248 28.6% 297 28.8% 
Total 162  868  1030  
 
The sample consists of transaction records of corporate divestiture via equity carve-out and asset sell-offs in the 
period of 1983-2005. The numbers of divestiture transaction by year are presented in panel A. Panel B report the 
distribution of divestiture transactions by industry. The total sample contains 162 equity carve-out and 868 asset 
sell-offs. I report proceeds of carve-out transactions and consideration paid by the acquirer in asset sell-off 
transactions. The Mean and Median columns report in millions of dollars. 
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Table 2.2 Proportion of divested unit to the divesting parent 
 
 Asset Sell-off Equity Carve-out 
Year Mean Median Mean Median 
1983 18.6% 33.6% 30.4% 14.0% 
1984 12.3% 18.8% 15.1% 18.2% 
1985 13.9% 23.3% 17.1% 21.0% 
1986 22.5% 20.7% 38.0% 14.0% 
1987 12.2% 14.5% 8.3% 14.1% 
1988 10.9% 18.9% 13.7% 30.0% 
1989 19.7% 13.0% 15.6% 51.9% 
1990 19.7% 32.0% 14.1% 12.7% 
1991 13.2% 18.3% 69.0% 14.5% 
1992 25.4% 35.5% 42.3% 20.7% 
1993 14.7% 26.7% 14.5% 16.1% 
1994 25.9% 10.2% 10.4% 33.1% 
1995 11.8% 21.1% 13.0% 54.2% 
1996 11.8% 12.2% 12.7% 17.7% 
1997 22.7% 21.6% 29.5% 24.3% 
1998 12.5% 20.2% 28.6% 12.9% 
1999 33.3% 19.9% 7.2% 13.5% 
2000 9.5% 32.8% 41.7% 183.6% 
2001 26.3% 16.5% 12.3% 14.7% 
2002 7.0% 10.7% 18.9% 18.9% 
2003 21.2% 11.5% 10.9% 96.4% 
2004 21.8% 33.3% 6.6% 6.6% 
2005 17.6% 21.2% 20.8% 11.9% 
Total 18.6% 33.6% 21.3% 31.1% 
 
This table reports the relative size between the divested unit and its parent. It is the average ratio of the sales price of 
divested assets to the pre-deal total assets.  
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Table 2.3 Descriptive statistics for divesting parents 
 
The table provides the mean of accounting, financial, and other firm-specific variables that are supposed to have an 
influence on the divestiture method for a sample of equity carve-outs (n=162) and a sample of asset sell-offs (n= 
868). Variables are collected for each divesting parent at the fiscal year end proceeding the year in which the 
transaction occurs. Number of segments is the total number of business lines reported by the firm which accounted 
for at least 10% of the firm‟s sales. Relate2 and Relate3are dummy variables that take value of 1 when the firm and 
its divested division are operating in the same business line (as categorized by the two and three digit SIC code) and 
0 otherwise. Number of analyst coverage is measured as the mean number of analysts making one or two-year 
earnings forecasts in any month of the year for each firm-calendar year. I define the analyst earnings forecast error 
as the absolute value of the difference between the mean earnings estimate and the actual earnings scaled by the 
price per share at the end of the month in which earnings information is released. I calculate analyst earnings 
forecast dispersion as the standard deviation of earnings forecasts scaled by the stock price at the end of the month 
in which earnings information is released. Intangible assets ratio is computed as the firm‟s total intangibles assets 
divided by the firm‟s total assets. Size is measured as the logarithm of the firm‟s book value of total assets at the end 
of the previous fiscal year. Market to book is the ratio of market value to book value of equity. Leverage is the book 
value of total debt divided by the sum of the book value of total debt and the market value of equity. Operating 
margin is measured as the earnings before interest, taxes, and depreciation (EBITD) to book value of assets. R&D 
ratio is the research and development expenses, scaled by book value of total assets. Relative size is the sales price 
of divested assets to the pre-deal total assets. The mean values for the two groups of parent firms are reported in the 
first two columns. The last column reports the two-sample t-test of the hypothesis that the means of the two groups 
are equal. ***, **, and * indicate the difference is significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively, in a two-
tailed test. 
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Variables Asset Sell-off Parents Carve-out Parents T-test 
Number of business segments  2.95 2.48 2.38** 
    
Sales-based Herfindahl Index  0.58 0.69 1.89* 
    
Assets-based Herfindahl Index 0.59 0.68 1.77* 
    
Relate2 (2 digit SIC code) 0.33 0.44 2.58*** 
    
Relate3 (3 digit SIC code) 0.22 0.3 1.96** 
    
Number of analyst coverage  10 12 2.89 *** 
    
Earnings forecast error  0.31 0.05 1.61*** 
    
Earnings forecast dispersion  3.8 0.86 1.88*** 
    
Intangible assets ratio  14.9% 8.9% 4.78*** 
    
Size 7.3 8.2 4.66*** 
    
Market to book 1.46 1.96 0.95 
    
Leverage 0.66 0.65 1.12 
    
Operating margin 6.8% 7.1% 0.82 
    
R&D Ratio 2.4% 2.5% 0.67 
    
Relative Size 18.6% 21.3% 0.92 
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Table 2.4 Operating performance between divesting parents: 
equity carve-out and asset sell-off 
 
 
Operating Performance 
(EBITDA/Total Assets) 
Asset Sell-off 
Parents 
Carve-out 
Parents 
Difference T-test 
Year of event 0.07 0.07 0.00 0.82 
     
Year 1 0.10 0.07 0.03 3.12 *** 
     
Year 2 0.12 0.08 0.04 1.81 * 
     
Year 3 0.12 0.09 0.03 3.69 *** 
     
Industry adjusted – Year 0 0.005 0.006 0.00 0.07  
     
Industry adjusted – Year 1 0.025 -0.015 0.04 3.55 *** 
     
Industry adjusted – Year 2 0.031 0.00 0.031 2.28 ** 
     
Industry adjusted – Year 3 0.034 -0.015 0.05 4.21 *** 
     
     
     
 
This table reports the averages of long-term operating performance of divesting parents in the year of the divestiture 
events and over periods that extend from 1 to 3 years following the divestiture events. The operating performance is 
measured as the earnings before interest, taxes, and depreciation (EBITD) to book value of assets. ***, **, and * 
indicate the difference is significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively, in a two-tailed test.  
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Table 2.5 Long-run average excess returns of divesting firms  
 
This table reports the long-term average excess return (AER) over periods that extend from 1 to 3 years following 
the divestiture events. The excess return (ER) for each event firm is calculated in this table as: 
 
ERi,a,b= ∏
b
t=a  (Rit- Rm,t), 
 
Where ERi,a,b represents the excess return for event firm i over the time period from month a to month b, Rit is the 
return of event firm i on month t, and Rmt is the value weighted market return on month t. The post-announcement 
long-term abnormal returns do not include the abnormal returns in month of the announcement date. The sample 
consists of 868 asset sell-offs parent firms and 162 equity carve-out parent firms in the period from January 1983 
through December 2005. The statistical significance of each of the AER is tested using the parametric t-test, based 
on the cross-sectional standard deviations. The null hypothesis tested is that the estimate of AER is equal to zero. 
***, **, and * indicate the difference is significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively, in a two-tailed test. 
 
 
 
 
 
Number 
of obs 
Statistic 
Post-announcement Period 
year 1 year 2 year 3 3 years 
Carve-out 162 AER(%) -0.05 -0.05 -0.08 -0.18 
  t-statistic [1.55] [1.65]* [1.75]* [2.53]** 
Asset sell-
off 
868 AER(%) 0.02 0.04 0.05 0.09 
  t-statistic [1.2] [2.81]*** [2.89]*** [3.98]*** 
Difference  Mean 0.07 0.09 0.13 0.27 
  t-test [1.82]* [2.67]*** [3.18]*** [3.67]*** 
  
88 
 
Table 2.6 Long-run buy-and-hold average abnormal returns of divesting firms using the 
matching method  
 
This table reports the long-term buy-and-hold average abnormal return (BHAAR) over holding periods that extend 
from 1 to 4 years following the divestiture events, excluding the month of announcement date. The buy-and-hold 
abnormal return (BHAR) for each event firm is calculated in this table as: 
 
BHARi,a,b= ∏
b
t=a  (Rit+ 1) - ∏
b
t=a  (Rm,t +1), 
 
where BHARi,a,b represents the excess return for event firm i over the time period from month a to month b, Rit is the 
return of event firm i on month t, and Rmt is the return of the matched firm on month t. Matched firms are selected 
using the following set of matching criteria : 1(year); (2) industry; (3) market-to-book; (4) size. The post-
announcement long-term abnormal returns do not include the abnormal returns in month of the announcement date. 
If an event firm is delisted before the end of a buy-and-hold period, its truncated return series is still included in the 
analysis, and it is assumed to earn the monthly return of the bench mark for the remainder of the period. The sample 
consists of 868 asset sell-offs parent firms and 163 equity car-out parent firms in the period from January 1983 
through December 2005. The statistical significance of each of the BHAAR is tested using the parametric t-test, 
based on the cross-sectional standard deviations. The null hypothesis tested is that the estimate of BHAAR is equal 
to zero. ***, **, and * indicate the difference is significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively, in a two-
tailed test. 
 
 
 
Number 
of obs 
Statistic 
Post-announcement Buy-and-Hold Period 
1 year 2 years 3 years 4 years 
Carve-out 162 BHAAR(%) -0.03 -0.12 -0.14 -0.23 
  t-statistic 0.57 -1.21 -2.94*** -2.67*** 
Asset sell-
off 
868 BHAAR(%) 0.00 0.04 0.07 0.10 
  t-statistic 0.06 2.27** 2.04** 2.29** 
Difference  Mean 0.02 0.16 0.21 0.33 
  t-test 1.19 1.81*** 1.79*** 2.02** 
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Table 2.7 
Long-run abnormal of divesting firms using the rolling portfolio method 
 
This table reports the post announcement average abnormal monthly returns (αp), which are estimated using the 
rolling portfolio method. For every month, the equally and valued weighted returns on the portfolio, which contains 
all firms that sell-off or carve-out its segment during the preceding 12, 24, 36 or 48 calendar months, not including 
the month of announcement date, are estimated. Then, the calendar-time event-portfolio returns are used in the 
following Fama and French (1993) three-factor plus momentum model to estimate the portfolio‟s abnormal returns: 
 
Rp,t–Rf,t= αp + βp (Rm,t– Rf,t) + spSMBt + hpHMLt + mpUMDt + ep,t, 
 
where Rp,t represents the return on the event portfolio in the month t; Rf,t is the 1-month U.S. Treasury bill rate in 
month t; Rm,t is the return on the equally-weighted index of all NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ listed stocks in month 
t;SMBt is the difference between the returns on portfolios of small and big stocks (below or above the NYSE median 
value) with the same weighted average book-to-market value of equity ratio in month t; HMLt is the difference 
between the returns on portfolios of high and low book-to-market value of equity ratio (above and below the 0.7 and 
0.3 fractiles) with about the same weighted average size in month t; and UMDt is the difference between the returns 
on up and down return portfolio that mimics the momentum risk factor. The intercept αp is then interpreted as the 
average monthly abnormal return of the event portfolio across all 24, 36 or 48 months, as corresponds to the rolling 
portfolio. Equally and valued weighted calendar-time portfolio returns are computed each month for all parents 
firms that either had a carve-out or sold off its business segment in the previous 24, 36 or 48 calendar months. Since 
the number of firms included in the rolling event portfolio changes over time, the weighted least squares (WLS) 
estimates of the intercept αp are provided below. The weights used in the WLS model are equal to the number of 
event firms in the monthly portfolio.Also, the value-weighted returns are computed using the market values of the 
firms in the rolling portfolio as of the end of the month before the announcement date as the weighing vector. The 
sample consists of 868 asset sell-offs parent firms and 162 equity carve-out parent firms in the period from January 
1985 through December 2005. The statistical significance of each of the average abnormal monthly returns (αp) is 
tested using the parametric t-test. The null hypothesis tested is that the estimate of αp is equal to zero. ***, **, and * 
indicate the difference is significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively, in a two-tailed test. 
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Post 
Announcement 
Period 
Event 
Portfolio 
Return 
Statistic 
Parent firms Sample  
Carve-out Sell-off Difference 
1 year 
Value 
weighted 
αp  -0.027 0.075 
0.1*** 
t-statistic -0.64 4.49*** 
Equally 
weighted 
αp  -0.07 0.015 
0.09** 
t-statistic -1.96** 1.07 
2 years 
Value 
weighted 
αp  -0.09 0.16 
0.25*** 
t-statistic -1.28 6.07*** 
Equally 
weighted 
αp  -0.06 0.047 
0.11** 
t-statistic -0.85 2.01** 
3 years 
Value 
weighted 
αp  0.25 0.24 
-0.01 
t-statistic 2.89** 6.64*** 
Equally 
weighted 
αp  -0.11 0.07 
0.18** 
t-statistic -1.34 2.06** 
4 years 
Value 
weighted 
αp  0.26 0.31 
0.05 
t-statistic 2.46** 6.91*** 
Equally 
weighted 
αp  -0.09 0.09 
0.18** 
t-statistic -0.86 2.13** 
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Table 2.8 
Post announcement long-run buy-and-hold abnormal returns – Multivariate result 
 
This table reports the regressions using as dependent variable, the long-run buy and hold abnormal return of carve-
out parents as well as that of asset sell-off parents. Sell-off is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the 
transaction is an asset sell-off and zero otherwise. Focus is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the 
divestiture transaction results in an increase in the parent firm‟s level of focus. R&D is a dummy variable that 
indicates a firm with high level of research and development (R&D) expenses. Become acquirer is a dummy 
variable that take the value of one if the divesting parent becomes an acquirer within one after the divestiture and 
zero otherwise. Other variables are defined in previous tables. P-values are reported in the brackets. ***, **, and * 
indicate the coefficient is significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively, in a two-tailed test. 
  
Variables (1) (2) (3) 
Sell-off  0.14   
 [0.03]**   
Focus  0.22 0.24 
  [0.08]* [0.08]* 
Focus * R&D   -0.12 
   [0.10]* 
Become acquirer -0.17 -0.27 -0.19 
 [0.62] [0.54] [0.64] 
Relative Size 0.01 -0.14 0.16 
 [0.98] [0.77] [0.6] 
MTB -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
 [0.50] [0.58] [0.34] 
Lev 0.53 0.59 0.12 
 [0.31] [0.26] [0.92] 
Size 0.008 0.002 -0.01 
 [0.89] [0.97] [0.38] 
FE 1.3 1.26 0.25 
 [0.19] [0.27] [0.42] 
DISPER 0.75 1.2 0.18 
 [0.60] [0.65] [0.94] 
INTAN_R 0.009 0.006 0.001 
 [0.67] [0.15] [0.42] 
R-Square 0.08 0.08 0.02 
No of obs 1030 1030 267 
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Table 2.9 
Divestiture announcement abnormal returns - Multivariate result 
 
In this table, the dependent variable is the announcement excess return during the [-1, +1] window. Focus is a 
dummy variable that takes the value of one if the divestiture transaction results in an increase in the parent firm‟s 
level of focus. R&D is a dummy variable that indicates a firm with high level of research and development (R&D) 
expenses. Other variables are defined in previous tables. P-values are reported in the brackets. ***, **, and * 
indicate the coefficient is significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively, in a two-tailed test. 
 
Variables Excess Return 
Focus 0.027 
 [0.06]* 
Focus * R&D -0.01 
 [0.1]* 
Relative Size 0.001 
 [1.22] 
Market to Book -0.005 
 [0.67] 
Leverage 0.01 
 [0.75] 
Size 0.003 
 [1.35] 
Analyst earnings forecast error 0.008 
 [1.95]* 
Analyst earnings forecast dispersion 0.06 
 [1.25] 
Intangible Assets/ Total Assets 0.005 
 [0.18] 
R-Square 0.04 
No of obs 313 
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Table 2.10 
Logistic regression of factors influencing divestiture choice 
 
In this table, the dependent variable is a dummy that takes the value of one if the observation is an asset sell-off, and 
takes value of zero if it is an equity carve-out. Year 0 represents the year in which the transaction occurs. I measure 
all the independent variables in the year -1. Market value of equity is retrieved from CRSP. H_INDEX_S is a sales-
based Herfindahl Index across the firm‟s business segments while H_INDEX_A is an assets-based Herfindahl Index 
across the firm‟s business segments. N_SEG is the total number of business lines reported by the firm which 
accounted for at least 10% of the firm‟s sales. Relate2 and Relate3 are dummy variables that take value of 1 when 
the firm and its divested division are operating in the same business line (as categorized by the two and three digit 
SIC code) and 0 otherwise. N_ALYS is the mean number of analysts making one or two-year earnings forecasts in 
any month of the year for each firm-calendar year. I define the analyst earnings forecast error FE as the absolute 
value of the difference between the mean earnings estimate and the actual earnings scaled by the price per share at 
the end of the month in which earnings information is released. I calculate analyst earnings forecast dispersion 
DISPER as the standard deviation of earnings forecasts scaled by the stock price at the end of the month in which 
earnings information is released. Intangible assets ratio (INTAN_R) is computed as the firm‟s total intangibles 
assets divided by the firm‟s total assets. Size is measured as the logarithm of the firm‟s book value of total assets at 
the end of the previous fiscal year. Market to book is the ratio of market value to book value of equity. Leverage is 
the book value of total debt divided by the sum of the book value of total debt and the market value of equity. R&D 
is a dummy variable that indicates a firm with high level of research and development (R&D) expenses. I include, 
but not report, industry and year dummies in the regressions (1) – (10). P-values are reported in the brackets. ***, 
**, and * indicate the coefficient is significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively, in a two-tailed test. 
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Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
           
N_SEG 0.21       0.27 0.21 0.16 
 [0.02]**       [0.01]*** [0.09]* [0.04]** 
N_SEG*R&D          -0.15 
          [0.08]* 
H_INDEX_S  -0.02         
  [0.10] *         
RELATE2   -0.39     -0.22 -0.22  
   [0.04]**     [0.43] [0.47]  
N_ALYS    -0.01       
    [0.93]       
FE     1.42    2.1  
     [0.10]*    [0.17]  
DISPER      0.07   0.73  
      [0.17]   [0.82]  
INTAN_R       0.02 0.03 0.02  
       [0.00]*** [0.01]*** [0.03]**  
SIZE -0.4 -0.3 -0.27 -0.25 -0.29 -0.27 -0.26 -0.41 -0.52 -041 
 [0.00]*** [0.00]*** [0.00]*** [0.00]*** [0.00]*** [0.00]*** [0.00]*** [0.00]*** [0.00]*** [0.00]*** 
MTB 0.007 0.007 0.01 0.006 0.007 0.008 0.02 0.02 0.006 0.007 
 [0.57] [0.58] [0.55] [0.76] [0.73] [0.7] [0.37] [0.49] [0.81] [0.63] 
LEV 0.03 -0.2 -0.27 -0.1 0.42 0.37 -0.26 0.07 0.46 -0.14 
 [0.93] [0.65] [0.48] [0.82] [0.41] [0.47] [0.55] [0.88] [0.51] [0.45] 
No of Obs 535 548 887 814 767 730 749 463 369 456 
 
